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Abstract 
The absence of legislation, the lack of a standard cybersecurity framework, and the 
failure to adopt a resilient cybersecurity posture can be detrimental to the availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity of municipal information systems. The purpose of this 
phenomenological study was to understand the cybersecurity posture of municipalities 
from the perception of public servants serving in information technology (IT) leadership 
roles in highly populated municipalities in the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas 
Metropolitan Statistical Area of Puerto Rico. The study was also used to address key 
factors influencing the cybersecurity posture of these municipalities. The theoretical 
framework was open system theory used in combination with a conceptual framework 
encompassing key dimensions influencing digital government. Data were collected using 
semistructured interviews with 10 public servants working in IT leadership positions in a 
municipal setting in Puerto Rico. Data analysis involved horizontalization, reduction, 
elimination, clustering, thematizing, validation, and development of individual and 
composite textural descriptions. Participants reported that the cybersecurity posture of 
their municipalities was resilient. Participants also reported that technological changes, 
politics, the economy, management support, and processes were key elements to achieve 
a resilient posture. Findings may be used to empower elected officials, policymakers, 
public servants, and practitioners to manage and improve elements affecting 
cybersecurity with the goal of achieving a resilient posture to deliver cybersecurity as a 
public good.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Information resources have become essential to support the private sector, the 
government, and the general population. These entities depend on information systems to 
manage data assets and perform the activities required to fulfill their respective business 
purposes and mandates. Information systems can be subject to criminal attacks capable of 
jeopardizing their functionality, as well as related sensitive data. Hackers are the actors 
responsible for executing these attacks. The term hacker was first used to refer to 
problem solvers and programmers who were responsible for the development of 
automated systems and computer programs (Taylor, Fritsch, Liederbach, & Holt, 2011). 
The meaning of hacker has evolved to include cybercriminals such as crackers, script 
kiddies, black hats, and hacktivists trying to gain or having gained unauthorized access to 
information systems (Kissel, 2013). 
The use of technology as a vehicle to commit crimes has become a common threat 
(Taylor et al., 2011). The federal government is working to address the challenges and 
threats affecting cyberspace. Most federal agencies are incorporating cyber divisions to 
protect and defend their information resources. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA) of 1986 and the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 
2014 are the primary information security policies addressing cyber threats. The CFAA 
of 1986 regulates illegal hacking against protected computers, including access without 
authorization or exceeding authorized access. Alternatively, FISMA of 2014 mandates 
the protection of information technology (IT) infrastructure and services and establishes 
“a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security 
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controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets” (p. 128). 
Under FISMA of 2014, federal agencies and organizations processing federal information 
are responsible for implementing security controls in accord with federal “policies, 
procedures, standards, and guidelines” (p. 128).  
Despite regulations such as CFAA of 1986 and FISMA of 2014, the Internet 
remains a “lawless frontier where bullies, deviants, criminals, and terrorists can roam 
freely with reckless abandon” (Taylor et al., 2011, p. 2). A comprehensive information 
security policy may avoid gaps that could be exploited by cybercriminals. Technology is 
constantly evolving, and these changes can affect the ability of policymakers at all 
government levels to develop legislation to address the possible impact and consequences 
of using new technologies. The CFAA of 1986 covers all government computers, as well 
as nongovernment computers, use for “interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication” (p. 298). However, FISMA of 2014 is only applicable to entities 
responsible for federal information and information systems. This situation created a gap 
in policy for the state and local governments, leaving them without a legal obligation and 
the absence of a standard framework.  
Cyber threats are everybody’s concern. State and local governments have started 
to develop and implement information security policies. For instance, the Oficina de 
Gerencia y Presupuesto (OGP) de Puerto Rico [Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) of Puerto Rico] established Tecnologías de Información Gubernamental (TIG) 
[Government Information Technology] -003: Security of Information Systems Policy to 
provide government agencies with guidelines to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and 
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availability of the information systems and data assets under their jurisdiction. However, 
policy-making tends to be reactive to cyber incidents (Bertot, Seifert, & Jaeger, 2015). 
This situation could result in legislation that is neither up to date nor comprehensive 
enough to address the complexity of cyber threats. The absence of information security 
policies and standard frameworks can influence the cybersecurity posture of local 
governments and affect the safety of their constituents. Furthermore, the cost of 
implementing cybersecurity measures can be expensive for local governments, especially 
those in Puerto Rico.  
Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States that operates as a 
Commonwealth (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2016). Despite the territory status, 
Puerto Rico’s government branches, administrative divisions, judiciary system, and 
population size resemble those of a state within the United States. Since 2006, Puerto 
Rico has been undergoing “a sharper recession than the rest of the United States” (U.S. 
Department of Treasury, 2015). Puerto Rico’s fiscal situation is affecting its ability to pay 
a public debt of $73 billion (CIA, 2016). This deficit affects Puerto Rico’s ability to 
support government operations, including the protection of information systems and data 
assets. The purpose of this study was to facilitate understanding of the cybersecurity 
postures within government municipalities in Puerto Rico and identify the factors 
influencing these postures. Findings may be used to improve the cybersecurity posture of 
the local government in Puerto Rico by supporting the security and availability of 
government systems through the development and implementation of cost-effective 
measures such as legislation, policies, procedures, and collaboration strategies. 
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The sections of this chapter introduce the cybersecurity posture of municipalities 
within Puerto Rico. These sections include the study’s background, problem, purpose, 
and research questions. I also describe the research frameworks that served as the lens to 
explore the research problem. This chapter also includes the nature of the study, 
definitions of key terms, assumptions, boundaries, limitations, and significance of the 
study. 
Background of the Study 
There is an increasing dependency on information systems, Internet technologies, 
and cyberspace. The term technology encompasses “the development and application of 
devices for productive processes” (Orrick, 2012, p. 396). These processes are meant to be 
beneficial to the common good. Unfortunately, criminals are also benefiting from these 
technologies as a vehicle to commit crimes. Government agencies such as municipalities 
are taking advantage of technology to facilitate democratic governance, increase citizen 
participation, perform daily operations, communicate with constituents, and provide 
public services (Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005; Sá, Rocha, & Pérez-Cota, 2015; Saxby, 
2015). Municipalities operate the closest to the people and serve as the principal provider 
of social and public services such as education, health, and infrastructure management. 
Other government duties include performing as first responders and being accountable 
for the public safety and emergency management of their jurisdiction (Sylves, 2015). The 
use of technology to fulfill these mandates is known as e-government and e-democracy.  
The Government of Puerto Rico through the enactment of legislation such as the 
Ley de Gobierno Electrónico de 2004 [Electronic Government Act (E-Government Act) 
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of 2004] has acknowledged the importance of information resources to promote 
economic development, improve the timeliness and quality of government services, and 
foster and preserve public trust. The E-Government Act of 2004 mandated agencies to 
incorporate IT to conduct government operations and improve their service delivery, 
performance, and ability to disclose information, thereby facilitating citizen participation. 
However, concerns about cyberattacks affect people’s trust in e-government, especially 
within small localities (MacManus, Caruson, & McPhee, 2013). Failing to secure the 
technology behind e-government and e-democracy can have an adverse impact on 
democracy (Sá et al., 2015; Saxby, 2015). These factors make the cybersecurity posture 
of local governments a problem worth studying. 
Cybersecurity is a complex concept encompassing many challenges and requiring 
numerous strategies to secure the components encompassing cyberspace. These strategies 
can include the development, implementation, and management of information security 
policies, training, education, security controls, and cross-sector partnerships. 
Cyberattacks can have adverse effects on public safety. For this reason, cybersecurity 
should be acknowledged as public good within a similar context to public safety (Asllani, 
White, & Ettkin, 2013). Asllani et al. (2013) pointed out “the role of federal, state, and 
local governments to implement policies and initiatives that improve the cybersecurity of 
individuals and organizations” (p. 9). Picazo-Vela, Gutierrez-Martinez, and Luna-Reyes 
(2012) recognized the need for developing and implementing information security 
policies to deter data compromise, prevent identity theft, and stimulate compliance with 
existing regulations. Bertot et al. (2015) agreed on the necessity to address cybersecurity 
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threats through policy and technical solutions. However, current policy efforts are 
reactionary and have been unable to catch up to emerging threats and technologies 
(Bertot et al., 2015). 
Public servants at all government levels are responsible for complying with 
current policies and implementing adequate security controls. However, most federal 
policies have failed to account for the local government and its domain within 
cyberspace. This situation could affect the cybersecurity posture of government 
municipalities and local operating agencies by leaving them more vulnerable to cyber 
threats. In response, the government must be active in addressing policy gaps and 
defining adequate security controls to cover the entire echelon of government operations. 
Compliance with federal policies like FISMA of 2014 could help develop a 
resilient national cybersecurity posture and protect the local government’s operations, 
technology investment, mission critical data assets, and other sensitive information. 
However, FISMA of 2014 is only applicable to federal agencies and organizations 
processing federal information. State and local government voluntary compliance with 
federal policy could have a significant impact on the fiscal operations. For instance, 
voluntary compliance with information security policy such as FISMA of 2014 involves 
expenditures related to addressing system vulnerabilities, developing security safeguards, 
implementing security controls, and assessing the cybersecurity posture of the systems. 
These requirements can increase operational cost and affect the budget of municipal 
agencies. 
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According to the U.S. Department of Treasury (2015), “Puerto Rico is deploying 
onerous and unsustainable emergency liquidity actions” (p. 3) to continue providing 
government services. The fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico has caused the government to 
expedite strategies to reduce operational costs. In a continuous attempt to decrease 
government spending, the governor of Puerto Rico during 2012 to 2016 issued an Orden 
Ejecutiva (OE) [Executive Order] to repeal the Executive Order OE-2009-009 (2009) that 
established the office and responsibilities of chief information officer (CIO) of Puerto 
Rico. Executive Order No. 2015-019 (2015) dismantled the office of the CIO and 
transferred some of the responsibilities into the Departamento de Desarrollo Económico y 
Comercio [Department of Economic Development and Commerce] (p. 1). These actions 
left Puerto Rico without an IT executive and technical advisor responsible for the 
development and implementation of information security policies, strategic plans, 
standards, and enterprise architecture. 
In the absence of adequate information security policy, local government 
personnel, including elected officials, public servants, and IT leaders should have a sense 
of duty to look at other information assurance (IA) strategies that may help to protect 
their information systems and data assets. However, there is a “significant knowledge 
gap” (Caruson, MacManus, & McPhee, 2012, p. 11) between IT professionals and public 
administrators. This gap acts as a policy obstacle affecting the planning and 
implementation of security controls. According to Caruson et al. (2012), this situation is 
one of the reasons why the solution to the existing cybersecurity problem may require 
actors external to the government to take action. 
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A cybersecurity triad based on collaboration among government levels, the 
private sector, and the general population can help mitigate cyber threats. Asllani et al. 
(2013) concluded that “cybersecurity requires…federal, state, and local government 
organizations; and private organizations and individuals to implement good cybersecurity 
controls” (p. 13). A compromise in a municipal system could jeopardize the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of interconnected systems, including systems at 
state and federal levels. Cyber awareness, training, and education are critical factors 
affecting cyber preparedness. These factors are also crucial for reducing the existing 
knowledge gap about cybersecurity (Caruson et al., 2012). Given these factors, the 
federal government established the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 
(NICE) to be responsible “for cybersecurity awareness, education, training, and 
workforce development” (Paulsen, McDuffie, Newhouse, & Toth, 2012, p. 76). 
A resilient cybersecurity posture requires the government, the private sector, and 
the people to be cognizant of cyber threats, as well as their risks and mitigation strategies. 
Asllani et al. (2013) placed the government at the top of the cybersecurity triad. This 
position makes public servants, especially those in IT leadership roles, the first line of 
defense and increases their need for awareness and education. However, a recent study 
revealed a significant knowledge gap among IT professionals and public servants, 
especially in the local government (Caruson et al., 2012). Bertot et al. (2015) stressed the 
need for education covering cybersecurity risks. Lack of training and awareness can 
become bureaucratic roadblocks affecting the implementation of security control 
(Caruson et al., 2012). Allowing public servants to attend cybersecurity-related 
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conferences and training with the private sector is essential to reduce the existing 
knowledge gap and foster public-private collaboration.  
The private sector also plays a critical role in the nation’s critical infrastructure, 
economy, education, and health. Asllani et al. (2013) explained the importance of public-
private partnerships (PPPs) such as InfraGard and the Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers. These partnerships facilitate sharing information and devising strategies to 
protect the nation’s critical infrastructure from cyber threats. PPPs are crucial to support 
the role of the general population within the cybersecurity triad. NICE started working on 
cyber awareness and education efforts by partnering with “community centers, school 
districts, and colleges and universities around the United States to help run cyber citizen 
forums” (Paulsen et al., 2012, p. 78).  
Minimal research has been conducted on the local government cybersecurity 
posture, especially as it relates to Puerto Rico. Existing studies on cybersecurity have 
focused on the private sector and the federal government. This situation has resulted in a 
significant gap in knowledge and literature about what local government agencies are 
doing to protect themselves against cyber threats and preventing or reacting against 
cyberattacks. Cyberspace represents a relatively new domain that policies have not been 
able to address with success. It is critical that public servants understand the factors 
influencing the cybersecurity posture of their organizations.  
Studying the cybersecurity posture of municipalities and the factors affecting such 
postures was necessary to expand the current cybersecurity knowledge base. Exploring 
the posture of municipalities within Puerto Rico may improve understanding of their 
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stance and identify influential factors to support the development and implementation of 
cost-effective strategies to improve cybersecurity at the local government level. These 
strategies include adopting adequate security standards and guidelines, improving 
policies and procedures, aligning procurement and acquisition with cybersecurity needs, 
developing new cybersecurity and privacy training or taking advantage of other 
government agency’s training resources, and implementing partnerships with other 
government agencies and the private sector. These strategies may be used to facilitate the 
development of a resilient cybersecurity posture in municipalities within Puerto Rico, as 
well as other local governments within the United States. 
Problem Statement 
The absence of legislation, the lack of a standard cybersecurity framework, and 
the failure to adopt a resilient cybersecurity posture are detrimental to the availability, 
confidentiality, and integrity of information systems. Municipal governments are 
benefiting from information systems to perform and manage daily operations. Advances 
in technology have also enabled criminals to develop new strategies, expand their 
operations, and increase their ability to reach out to more potential victims, including the 
government (Taylor et al., 2011). Municipalities are responsible for providing direct 
social and public services to their constituency. Furthermore, municipalities serve as 
primary responders and are responsible for the public safety and disaster recovery of their 
jurisdictions (Sylves, 2015). Cyberattacks against municipalities could be devastating to 
their governance, the economy, and the well-being of their constituents. 
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Federal, state, and local governments need to manage similar controlled 
unclassified information (CUI) to fulfill their mandates. CUI includes personally 
identifiable information (PII) of constituents and employees, law enforcement operations, 
and information about critical infrastructures, among other sensitive data (U.S. National 
Archives and Records Administration, 2018). A compromise on any of these data asset 
can affect the government’s reputation, force unnecessary expenditure, undermine 
response to emergency events, and disable governance capabilities (Caruson et al., 2012). 
At the federal level, FISMA of 2014 provides a framework of security controls to protect 
information resources from cyber threats. However, state and local governments are not 
subject to federal information security policies such as FISMA of 2014. In the same way 
as FISMA of 2014, other federal mandates like circulars from the OMB and several 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) do not require compliance by these 
entities. 
Caruson et al. (2012) affirmed that there has been minimal research on the 
cybersecurity posture of local governments and the ability of public servants to manage 
and implement security controls to mitigate cyber threats. Recent studies on cybersecurity 
have concentrated on the federal government, leaving a gap in knowledge about this 
phenomenon at the local level. The cost to voluntarily comply with federal information 
security policy can affect the operational cost of local governments. Understanding the 
cybersecurity posture of municipal governments may assist in developing cost-effective 
strategies to improve the resiliency of the cybersecurity posture of these organizations. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to understand the cybersecurity posture of 
municipalities from the perception of public servants serving in IT leadership roles in 
Puerto Rico. The study also addressed the primary factors influencing the cybersecurity 
posture of municipal governments in Puerto Rico. A phenomenological approach was 
used to address the knowledge gap about the problem. This qualitative study focused on 
the lived experiences of IT leaders as information-rich cases. In this study, cybersecurity 
posture was defined as the security status of the municipal “networks, information, and 
systems based on IA resources (e.g., people, hardware, software, policies) and 
capabilities in place to manage the defense of the enterprise and to react as the situation 
changes” (Kissel, 2013, p. 179). 
Research Questions 
Two qualitative research questions (RQs) guided the study. These questions were 
designed to address the lived experiences of IT leaders regarding the phenomenon under 
study. The research questions for this study were the following:  
RQ1: How do public servants in IT leadership roles perceive the cybersecurity 
posture of government municipalities in Puerto Rico? 
RQ2: What factors do public servants in IT leadership roles perceive as most 
influential to achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture in government municipalities in 
Puerto Rico? 
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Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical framework for the study was the open system theory (OST). This 
theory originated from the general system theory (GST). Bertalanffy (as cited in Sher, 
2004) argued that “studying the smallest elements of phenomena was disadvantageous 
because that way one lost sight of the whole” (p. 613). Therefore, Bertalanffy (as cited in 
Sher, 2004) proposed a multidisciplinary approach incorporating theories and concepts 
from different disciplines to study phenomena as a whole. According to Sher (2004), 
Bertalanffy’s GST emphasizes the arrangements, functions, and relationships of the 
elements of a system or phenomena. GST has been applied to system engineering, 
cybernetics, information systems, and social sciences (Bailey, 2005).  
The concept of cybersecurity involves most of these areas of study, especially 
information systems and social sciences. Shafritz, Ott, and Jang (2015) explained that 
these elements are interconnected and may include “inputs, processes, outputs, and 
feedback loops, and the environment” (p. 340). OST was relevant to this study because 
the cybersecurity posture of local government municipalities can be divided into 
empirical units. These entities include personnel, processes, and technologies. As 
proposed in OST, changes in one element have positive or adverse effects on other 
system components affecting the level of resiliency of the cybersecurity posture. 
Studying cybersecurity as an open system was intended to identify which elements are 
influencing the security posture of municipalities in Puerto Rico and to explain their 
relationships. 
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Conceptual Framework 
Cybersecurity consists of multiple realities, particularly when studied from the 
perspectives of individuals. The conceptual framework was based on the Picazo-Vela et 
al.’s (2012) key dimensions influencing digital government. This framework consists of 
six dimensions, including “(1) general context, (2) institutional framework, (3) 
interorganizational collaboration and networks, (4) organizational structures and 
processes, (5) information and data, and (6) technology” (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012, p. 
506). Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the dimensions influencing digital 
government. 
 
Figure 1. Dimensions influencing digital government. Adapted from “Understanding Risks, 
Benefits, and Strategic Alternatives of Social Media Applications in the Public Sector,” by S. 
Picazo-Vela, I. Gutierrez-Martinez, and L. F. Luna-Reyes, 2012, Government Information 
Quarterly 29(4), p. 507. 
The dimensions in the Picazo-Vela et al.’s (2012) framework were used to capture 
the complexity of the cybersecurity phenomenon. These interrelated dimensions 
contributed to the structure of the literature review, the development of interview 
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questions, the organization of the collected data, and the data analysis and interpretation. 
The dimensions also provided the lens to identify which elements are influencing the 
posture of government municipalities in Puerto Rico.  
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study was qualitative. I used a transcendental 
phenomenological design to study the cybersecurity posture of municipalities as a social 
problem. Most security artifacts are protected from public release by privacy laws like the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by Exception 2 (b). However, individuals such as IT 
leaders provided trustworthy and dependable alternative data sources that were used to 
study the cybersecurity posture of municipal governments.  
Phenomenology focuses on the experience of the participants. The current gap in 
knowledge and the limitations of privacy regulations made phenomenology a suitable 
approach to study cybersecurity. These conditions supported the rationale for using a 
phenomenological approach for performing the collection and analysis of data grounded 
in participants’ experiences. The phenomenon investigated was the perception of public 
servants in IT leadership roles regarding the cybersecurity posture of municipalities 
within Puerto Rico and the factors influencing this posture. The perceptions of 
participants originated from their lived experiences with different cybersecurity concepts.  
The key inquiries of the study were related to the ability of municipalities to 
protect the information resources under their jurisdiction from cyber threats and 
cyberattacks. The methodology included face-to-face interviews with individuals as the 
unit of analysis. The sample consisted of public servants working as IT leaders who had 
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experienced the phenomenon. A strategy incorporating purposeful and criterion sampling 
was used to identify 10 participants who served as information-rich cases. The 
semistructured interview protocol included 13 open-ended questions.  
The data obtained from the interviews were captured through a combination of 
field notes, mind maps, and audio recording. Data were organized using NVivo 
qualitative data analysis software. This software supported the coding, analysis, 
interpretation, and representation of the data. The data were analyzed through a 
combination of predetermined and emerging codes. Predetermined codes originated from 
the conceptual framework. Emerging codes were discovered as part of the data analysis. 
This methodology was used to describe the cybersecurity posture of municipalities and 
identify the factors that had the most significant influence on the phenomenon. 
Definitions 
Scholars agree on the need for concise definitions of the concepts related to the 
cybersecurity (Craigen, Diakun-Thibault, & Purse, 2014; Kenney, 2015; Tehrani, Manap, 
& Taji, 2013). Scholars, industries, organizations, and countries adhere to distinct 
definitions of cybersecurity concepts. Craigen et al. (2014) argued that not having a 
consistent meaning for these concepts could affect the development of solutions capable 
of addressing the complexity of cybersecurity. To provide uniform, concise, and reliable 
definitions, the Glossary of Key Information Security Terms was the primary source for 
defining the concepts related to the study. This glossary was developed by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in alignment with the Committee for 
National Security Systems. 
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Agency: Government entities of the executive branch of the government, public 
corporations, municipalities and legislatures, special corporations for municipal 
development, municipal corporations, boards and those entities under the jurisdiction of 
this branch (Ethics in Government Act, 2011). 
Attacker/hacker: An unauthorized user who attempts to or gains access to an 
information system (Kissel, 2013). 
Availability: The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an 
authorized entity (Kissel, 2013). 
Compromise: Disclosure of information to unauthorized persons, or a violation of 
the security policy of a system in which unauthorized intentional or unintentional 
disclosure, modification, destruction, or loss of an object may have occurred (Kissel, 
2013). 
Confidentiality: The property that sensitive information is not disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes (Kissel, 2013). 
Controlled unclassified information (CUI): Unclassified information (a) pertinent 
to the national interests of the United States or the important interests of entities outside 
the federal government, and (b) under law or policy requires protection from 
unauthorized disclosure, special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits (Kissel, 2013). 
Critical infrastructure: System and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to 
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have 
a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters (Kissel, 2013). 
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Cyber incident: Actions taken through the use of computer networks that result in 
an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system and the information 
residing therein (Kissel, 2013). 
Cyberattack: Attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace 
for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a 
computing environment/infrastructure, or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing 
controlled information (Kissel, 2013). 
Cybersecurity: The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from 
cyberattacks (Kissel, 2013). 
Cyberspace: A global domain within the information environment consisting of 
the interdependent network of information systems infrastructures including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers (Kissel, 2013). 
Data asset: A system or application output file, database, document, Web page, 
and service that may be provided to access data from an application (Kissel, 2013). 
Information assurance (IA): Measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. These measures include providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities 
(Kissel, 2013). 
Information resources: Information and related resources, such as personnel, 
equipment, funds, and IT (Kissel, 2013). 
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Information security policy: Aggregate of directives, regulations, rules, and 
practices that prescribe how an organization manages, protects, and distributes 
information (Kissel, 2013). 
Information sharing: Requirements for information sharing by an IT system with 
one or more other IT systems or applications, for information sharing to support multiple 
internal or external organizations, missions, or public programs (Kissel, 2013). 
Information system: A discrete set of information resources organized for the 
collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of 
information (Kissel, 2013). 
Information technology (IT): Any equipment or interconnected system or 
subsystem of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, 
management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or 
reception of data or information (Kissel, 2013). 
Integrity: The property that sensitive data have not been modified or deleted in an 
unauthorized and undetected manner (Kissel, 2013). 
IT leaders: Individuals responsible for the IA of a program, organization, system, 
or enclave (Kissel, 2013). 
Personally identifiable information (PII): Any information about an individual 
maintained by an agency, including (a) any information that can be used to distinguish or 
trace an individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of 
birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records; and (b) any other information that is 
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linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and 
employment information (Kissel, 2013). 
Public servant: Person in the government involved in the formulation and 
implementation of public policy or not, but performs as permanent or temporary, with or 
without pay. It also includes the contractor whose contract is equivalent to a position or 
responsibilities related to public policy (Ethics in Government Act, 2011).  
Resilience: The ability to quickly adapt and recover from any known or unknown 
changes to the environment through the holistic implementation of risk management, 
contingency, and continuity planning (Kissel, 2013). 
Security controls: The management, operational, and technical safeguards or 
countermeasures prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the system and its information (Kissel, 2013). 
Security posture: Status of an enterprise’s networks, information, and systems 
based on IA resources and capabilities in place to manage the defense of the enterprise 
and to react as the situation changes (Kissel, 2013). 
Security program plan: A formal document that provides an overview of the 
security requirements for an organization-wide information security program and 
describes the program management security controls and common security controls in 
place or planned for meeting those requirements (Kissel, 2013).  
Sensitive information: Information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or 
modification of, that could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of federal 
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programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under 5 U.S.C. Section 552a 
(Kissel, 2013). 
Threat: Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact 
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), 
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the nation through an 
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of 
information, or denial of service (Kissel, 2013). 
Vulnerability: Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, 
internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat 
source (Kissel, 2013). 
Assumptions 
Several assumptions were critical to the methodology, particularly the sampling 
strategy. The assumptions were related to the trustworthiness of the data, the selection of 
research sites, and the population sample. The unit of analysis consisted of IT leaders as 
individual entities. Privacy regulations protected against the disclosure or public release 
of cybersecurity documents. I assumed that the IT leaders would provide trustworthy and 
dependable data. Information security policies prevent organizations from sharing 
cybersecurity-related information. 
The sites for the study included municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina – 
Caguas Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as defined by the OMB Bulletin 13-01. The 
plan to target these municipalities emerged from the assumption that highly populated 
municipalities manage larger budgets, provide additional services, and require more 
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complex information resources than less populated municipalities. Highly populated 
municipalities need additional resources to support and sustain the continuity of their 
government operations for a larger population. This assumption justified considering 
municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA for the study.  
The conditions within highly populated municipalities had an influence on the 
selection of IT leaders for the study. Government agencies with additional functions, 
resources, and complex information systems enhanced the lived experiences of IT leaders 
working within these environments. The exposure of the participants to these conditions 
supported their inclusion as information-rich cases for the study. This assumption 
supported the use of purposeful and criterion sampling to identify participants that could 
serve as information-rich cases. Finally, I assumed that participants would be available to 
participate in interviews and provide member checking. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The purpose of the study was to explore the cybersecurity posture of 
municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA. This posture was related to 
the local government position to protect and defend information systems and data assets 
through the management of information resources and security policies. The purpose also 
included the analysis of the factors that may be influencing the administration of 
information resources and security controls. This focus was chosen to address the 
knowledge gap about the phenomenon, to develop strategies to support the local 
government’s cybersecurity resilience, and to identify areas for future research.  
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Delimitation consists of determining the limits or boundaries for the research 
(New Oxford American Dictionary, n.d.). Patton (2002) described delimitation as a 
process to eliminate “irrelevant, repetitive, or overlapping data” (Phenomenological 
Analysis, para. 6) to focus on the data that are more relevant for the study. The study was 
delimited to the population of public servants acting in IT leadership roles within the San 
Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA. The Government of Puerto Rico defines public servant 
as any person working within the government, including permanent, temporary, 
contracted, and without pay employee (Ethics in Government Act, 2011). This 
delimitation excluded participants from less populated municipalities that did not provide 
the conditions to support the development of IT leaders as information-rich cases.  
The theoretical foundation for the study was limited to the OST and the 
dimensions influencing digital government (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). Other related 
frameworks were excluded for not been relevant to the nature of the problem. For 
example, the complex adaptive systems framework addresses the behaviors of known 
agents within a system. These behaviors include “emergence, stability or chaos, 
adaptation, and attraction” (Morrell, 2005, p. 72). On the other hand, OST was designed 
to identify system components and examine their relationship.  
The outcomes of this study may contribute to the improvement of cybersecurity 
resilience of government and nongovernmental organizations in and outside of Puerto 
Rico. However, the scope and delimitations of the study did not provide for a direct 
transferability of the results. Puerto Rico’s governmental structure resembles that of a 
U.S. state. Puerto Rico is a commonwealth with an executive, legislative, and judiciary 
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branch. Similar to U.S. states, Puerto Rico’s administrative division includes a state 
government with an elected governor and jurisdictions or districts known as 
municipalities, each with an elected mayor. Also, the legal system in Puerto Rico consists 
of civil law within the context of the federal system (CIA, 2016). According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2015b), Puerto Rico ranks 30 in population size among the 50 states and 
territories with a total of 3,474,182 people. This similarity supported the transferability of 
the research methodology and design to study other local governments within the United 
States. 
Limitations 
The dependability of the data was crucial to the quality and significance of the 
study. The primary data source consisted of interviews with public servants in IT 
leadership roles to obtain their perceptions of the cybersecurity posture of the 
municipalities, as well as the factors influencing the perceived posture. Participants who 
lacked such experiences with cybersecurity at the local government could have affected 
the dependability of the data. Criterion sampling takes into consideration cases meeting a 
“predetermined criterion of importance” (Patton, 2002, Criterion sampling, para. 1). The 
criteria included at least 2 years of experience with the phenomenon as a senior IT 
professional. These conditions were essential to support the relevance of the data. 
The availability of the participants limited the scope of the study. The interviews 
were planned to take place in 2017. In some municipalities, this was the first year of the 
new administration after the 2016 election. These municipalities could have been waiting 
to appoint their IT leadership, or the appointed executives may have been working on 
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projects that may have affected their availability to participate. Reasonable measures to 
address this limitation included the identification of additional municipalities and 
participants within the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA as candidates for the study. 
However, a Category 5 hurricane struck the island, leaving most of the population 
without electricity and water. The local government was actively engaged in disaster 
response and recovery. The interviews were performed in May 2018. External threats 
such as the lack of literature relating to cybersecurity at the local government level also 
presented a limitation. However, literature about the federal and state levels was 
examined in the literature review. 
Significance of the Study 
Significance to Practice 
Understanding the cybersecurity posture of municipalities supported advances in 
practice and policy. The results helped to provide knowledge, identify skills, and promote 
attitudes to benefit IT leaders and policymakers on achieving a resilient cybersecurity 
posture. The study addressed the factors influencing such postures. Identifying and 
understanding these factors was crucial to provide comprehensive research-based 
solutions to improve the administration of information security programs and policies. 
Significance to Theory 
Studying the cybersecurity posture of municipalities resulted in a significant 
contribution to the discipline of public policy and administration. Cyberattacks can 
jeopardize government operations, the economy, and the well-being of constituents. 
These risks can cause social and economic injustice to individuals and communities 
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within the affected jurisdiction. The knowledge gap about this phenomenon represented a 
challenge to scholars in the discipline. Contributing to the body of knowledge provided 
better understanding and served as the foundation for future investigations targeting areas 
of relevance to cybersecurity at the municipal level. 
Significance to Social Change 
The outcomes of this study contributed to positive social change by empowering 
elected officials, public servants, IT leaders, and community members with knowledge 
about why it is essential to secure information systems and how to identify resources and 
policies to support cybersecurity. Also, public servants and IT leaders could develop 
skills to reassign resources, implement policies, and establish procedures to protect 
information systems and data assets from cyberattacks. Further, community members 
may become aware of cyber threats and assume an active role in supporting the 
government in the implementation of measures to improve their cybersecurity posture. 
These results may improve the resiliency of cybersecurity at the local, national, and 
international government levels. 
Summary and Transition 
Information resources are used to facilitate day-to-day tasks for the government, 
the private sector, and the people. Technology has also provided the opportunity to 
digitalize traditional criminal behavior (Taylor et al., 2011). Criminals have been able to 
improve their illegal operations, develop new illicit strategies, and expand their target to 
include the government. According to Caruson et al. (2012), cyberattacks can distress the 
government’s reputation, expenditure, and governance. 
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Internet technologies and cyberspace are relatively new areas for which policy has 
not been able to become accustomed. Also, technology and its uses are constantly 
evolving, which further impairs policy efforts to address cyber threats. The federal 
government has enacted information security policies, including legislation, circulars, and 
directives, to provide a standard security framework and controls to protect information 
resources. However, most of these policies have been focused on the federal government, 
and compliance has not been required for state or local governments. This circumstance 
generated a policy gap that fails to address cybersecurity at the local government level.  
This qualitative study addressed the security posture of municipalities within 
Puerto Rico. Additionally, the study addressed the factors influencing the cybersecurity 
posture of these organizations. The study targeted highly populated municipalities within 
the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA to explore a population with more experience 
with the phenomenon. Reducing the knowledge gap on the cybersecurity posture of 
municipalities may contribute to the development and implementation of cost-effective 
strategies and safeguards to mitigate cyber threats. In Chapter 2, I review the literature 
related to the study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The use of technologies such as computers, cloud services, e-mail, and social 
media facilitates the daily living of individual, private sector, and government entities. 
Technology has also increased the exposure of these entities to cyber threats. Tehrani et 
al. (2013) agreed that advances in technology are beneficial to society, but also useful for 
criminals and terrorist. These actors are taking advantage of technology to commit illicit 
activities from cyberspace. Furthermore, illicit activities such as cyberattacks can be 
executed from anywhere in the world against any target, including the government 
(Tehrani et al., 2013). 
The problem addressed in the study was the absence of legislation, the lack of a 
standard security framework, and the failure to adopt a resilient cybersecurity posture. 
These conditions can be detrimental to the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of 
local government systems. Municipalities are taking advantage of information systems to 
manage their operations and deliver public services. Further, municipal agencies are 
responsible for providing direct social and public services to their constituents. According 
to Sylves (2015), local governments are primary responders with responsibilities for the 
public safety and disaster recovery of their jurisdictions. Cyberattacks against municipal 
systems can have negative consequences on local governance, public services, public 
safety, and the economy. 
Cybersecurity represents a significant challenge in the preservation of national 
security, public safety, and the economy (Chen & Dongre, 2014; Roesener, Bottolfson, & 
Fernandez, 2014). Furthermore, the increasing social dependency on information systems 
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and new technologies is causing an upsurge of cyber threats and systems vulnerabilities, 
including severity and the frequency of cyberattacks (Kazemi, Khajouei, & Nasrabadi, 
2012). Lozowski (2015) discussed the results of a recent survey, which included 678 
participants from the United States. Lozowski explained that about 75% of participants 
agreed that the severity of cyberattacks has increased. Similarly, 68% agreed that 
cyberattacks have increased in frequency (Lozowski, 2015). These conditions make 
adopting a resilient cybersecurity posture imperative for individuals and organizations. 
Critical infrastructures such as power grid, mass transit, and financial systems are 
at risk of sophisticated cyberattacks capable of affecting lives and the economy (Roesener 
et al., 2014). The U.S. government understood the continuing growth of cyber threats 
against critical infrastructure and recognized it as one of the most serious security 
challenges that could affect national and economic security (Executive Order No. 13,636, 
2013). In response to the threats to critical infrastructure, the federal government enacted 
Executive Order 13,636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (2013) and the 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
(2013). These policies appoint federal agencies as the responsible parties for identifying 
and helping secure critical infrastructure (Executive Office of the President, 2013). 
State and local governments sometimes in partnership with the private sector are 
responsible for managing utilities, communication, transit, and financial systems. 
Cyberattacks against municipal infrastructures can affect hospitals, businesses, and 
government facilities. Moreover, attacks against transit systems can disturb timely, 
affordable, and necessary access to health, education, businesses, and government 
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services (Fok, 2015). Municipalities also depend on financial systems to manage payroll 
and administer government operations such as taxation and public services for their 
jurisdiction. Financial systems contain CUI, including PII. Taylor et al. (2011) affirmed 
that cybercrimes such as “identity theft and Internet fraud are constantly rising” (p. 2). 
Cyberattacks against municipal systems can affect the availability to meet their mandates 
and preserve the confidentiality of the data assets that could be used to commit identity 
theft and fraud. 
Executive Order 13,636 (2013) and PPD-21 (2013) identify state and local 
governments as critical infrastructure owners and define their roles as collaborators. 
However, federal information security policies are not necessarily applicable to 
nonfederal entities. Furthermore, these policies provide a set of voluntary security 
frameworks and controls. For instance, Executive Order 13,636 (2013) requires the 
establishment of a voluntary program supporting “the adoption of the Cybersecurity 
Framework by owners and operators of critical infrastructure and any other interested 
entities” (Sec. 8). However, the voluntary adoption of these security frameworks and 
controls represent an additional level of effort that could impact operating costs. 
Governments without the appropriate budgetary resources or those undergoing fiscal 
crisis such as Puerto Rico may not be able to adopt these requirements.  
The next sections of this chapter include the literature search strategy, theoretical 
and conceptual foundations, and the literature review. The literature search strategy 
includes the list of databases, search engines, terms, and conditions used to identify 
relevant literature. The theoretical and conceptual frameworks cover the previous 
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application, rationale, and relation to the OST and the dimensions influencing digital 
government to the study of the cybersecurity posture of local governments in Puerto 
Rico. The chapter also includes a review of the current literature related to the concepts 
and elements of cybersecurity. The chapter concludes with a summary of key themes and 
findings from the literature review. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The literature search strategy consisted of a combination of scholarly databases, 
government websites, search engines, and books. A total of four scholarly databases, 
including LexisNexis, ProQuest Central, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses @ Walden 
University, and Science Direct were used in the literature search process. In addition to the 
scholarly databases, government websites from the U.S. federal government and Puerto 
Rico were used to search for literature. U.S. federal government websites included U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Census Bureau, OMB, CIA, and the Executive 
Office of the President. Government websites for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
included Departamento de Estado de Puerto Rico [Puerto Rico Department of State], 
Oficina del Contralor de Puerto Rico [Office of the Comptroller of Puerto Rico], OGP, 
and Portal Oficial del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico [Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico Official Government Web Portal]. Google was the primary search engine used 
throughout the literature search process to navigate websites and search for terms.  
The terms used in the literature search included information technology, 
information system, cybersecurity, cyber security, information security, local 
government, and United States. Other terms, including information assurance and Puerto 
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Rico, were used in ad hoc searches with no relevant results. Depending on the query 
capabilities of the database, website, and search engine, these terms were combined using 
the AND search operator and the OR search operator. The main combination of terms 
contained cybersecurity, cyber security, and information security. 
The iterative search process included ad hoc searches for each term and analysis 
of the outcomes. Based on the analysis of the results, the search terms were combined, 
and additional criteria were added. The combination of terms returning the most relevant 
results was cybersecurity OR cyber security OR information security AND local 
government AND United States. Additional criteria, including limitation to only full text, 
peer-reviewed, and publication date, were used to ensure accessible, trustworthy, and 
relevant results. These conditions were applied to searches in ProQuest and Science 
Direct.  
There was limited research about cybersecurity at the state and local government 
level. All searches returned many articles related to cybersecurity. However, the articles 
were not directly related to the phenomenon, especially not at the local or municipal 
level. Independent of the efforts to limit the results to local and municipal governments, 
the outcomes were relevant to national and international levels. Several strategies were 
used to compensate for the shortage of literature about the phenomenon at the local 
government level. First, the search outcomes were limited to literature related to a 
national level and below with priority for both state and local governments. Further, 
websites from the U.S. federal government and Puerto Rico were searched for laws, 
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policies, and guidance related to cybersecurity and related concepts. Also, Lexis Nexis 
was used to search for laws enacted by the government of Puerto Rico. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The concept of cybersecurity posture was the phenomenon investigated, 
especially as it related to government municipalities. NIST explained the concept of 
security posture as the stance of an organization’s information resources “based on IA 
resources and capabilities in place to manage the defense of the enterprise and to react as 
the situation changes” (Kissel, 2013, p. 179). This definition made cybersecurity posture 
a multidimensional concept involving aspects such as people, technology, policies, 
processes, and organizational elements.  
Organizations can be studied and described within the context of an open system 
(Burke, 2011). Municipalities are organizations that, like open systems, are contingent to 
the dynamic interaction of internal and external dimensions within their environment. 
These interactions made OST a suitable theoretical framework for the study. OST 
emerged from GST. Based on the GST, scholars such as Von Bertalanffy, Katz, and 
Kahn outlined 10 distinctive characteristics present within open systems (Burke, 2011). 
These characteristics include the importation of energy, throughput, output, cycles of 
events, negative entropy, negative feedback, steady-state, differentiation, integration and 
coordination, and equifinality (Burke, 2011). 
The major theoretical proposition was that organizations need an energy source to 
generate the product and services related to their business purpose and required for their 
survival. This energy comes from their environment in the form of “money, raw 
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materials, or the work of people” (Burke, 2011, p. 56). The energy goes through different 
events as the throughput to produce outputs in the form of product or services. These 
events are considered cyclical. During these cycles, organizations are subject to entropy 
that could affect their existence (Burke, 2011).  
Feedback from the environment can be used to develop courses of action to 
support the stability of the organization. After achieving a level of stability, the 
organization can enter a process of differentiation focused on the growth and 
specialization of operations (Burke, 2011). This process goes hand and hand with the 
need to integrate and coordinate among the different organizational and environmental 
elements. Lastly, the concept of equifinality relates to the flexibility to achieve the same 
goal from different courses of action (Burke, 2011).  
In the case of cybersecurity, municipalities need energy to manage the events 
supporting the implementation and maintenance of security controls. These controls help 
to safeguard the municipalities from cyber threats and deliver cybersecurity as a service. 
The processes and the events related to the security controls are cyclical. Further, 
municipalities experiencing loss of energy such as budget cuts, personnel reduction, and 
other events affected by negative entropy that could result in successful cyber incidents. 
For this reason, the use of information and feedback is critical to developing courses of 
action capable of improving the cybersecurity posture of the municipalities. A resilient 
cybersecurity posture could facilitate reaching a steady-state that allows the 
municipalities to work on differentiation and coordination strategies. Lastly, the principle 
equifinality gives municipal IT leaders the opportunity to take the appropriate paths to 
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achieve a more desirable posture.  
According to Bailey (2005), the GST has been used to study phenomena related to 
information systems and social sciences. Further, OST has been used to investigate 
organizations and information system management (Burke, 2011). Johnson (2012) used 
systems engineering as an application of the system theory to analyze federal governance 
practices for protecting critical infrastructure from cyberattacks. According to Johnson, 
using systems engineering to study cyber terrorism provided the ability to concentrate on 
different elements related to the environment, the market, and the people. Understanding 
the different elements related to cyber terrorism can help to develop controls to protect 
critical infrastructure. Johnson affirmed that the system theory could facilitate the 
understanding of cyber terrorism as a system and support the process to sustain or 
improve the posture of critical infrastructure.  
Baker (2013) used a conceptual framework based on the GST to study the 
phenomenon of information sharing among public safety agencies. Baker described these 
agencies as open systems interacting with each other. As proposed in the GST, changes in 
one element can affect other interrelated elements and the system as a whole. This 
principle is also true for public agencies where changes in any aspect of the organization 
“can affect the entire organizational system” (Baker, 2013, p. 16). 
This research concentrated on studying municipalities as organizations and their 
cybersecurity postures as part of their IT management from a perspective of public policy 
and public administration which relates to the field of social sciences. Organizations such 
as municipalities encompassed interconnected elements, including “inputs, processes, 
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outputs, and feedback loops, and the environment” (Shafritz et al., 2015, p. 340). Also, 
their cybersecurity posture can be divided into interconnected elements. The OST 
proposed that changes in one element can affect other interconnected system components. 
Therefore, changes in one element can have positive or adverse effects on the resiliency 
level of the cybersecurity posture. These conditions support the rationale for choosing 
OST as the theoretical foundation for the study.  
Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) agreed that IT-related phenomena are 
multidimensional and encompass factors beyond “technological complexity” (p. 188). 
Gil-Garcia and Pardo recognized that irrespective of the diversity of challenges affecting 
IT projects, “notable consistencies exist across the disciplines” (p. 188). Gil-Garcia, 
Pardo, and Baker (2007) emphasized the importance of understanding the organizational 
and social factors influencing the IT phenomenon. Further, Gil-Garcia et al. recognized 
systems theory as an approach capable of providing a holistic view of IT phenomenon. 
Therefore, studying cybersecurity as an open system served as the theoretical lens to 
identify and explain the relationship of the elements influencing the security posture of 
government municipalities in Puerto Rico. The OST encompassed characteristics related 
to the internal and external dimensions of the organization, including their people, 
interorganizational collaboration, structures, processes, and technology. 
 Conceptual Framework 
Previous IT-related research shared the need for a framework capable of capturing 
multidimensional elements. According to Jiang and Klein (2000), researchers agreed 
“that system success is a multidimensional concept” (p. 4). Jiang and Klein were two of 
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the primary researchers contributing to the conceptual framework that was used during 
this study. Jiang and Klein employed surveys to study risks affecting IT project 
performance, especially as it related to software development. A crucial part of the 
research was to identify common project risks. Jiang and Klein discovered that the 
absence of expertise and clear roles had a substantial impact on project effectiveness. Gil-
Garcia et al. (2007) explained that “recognizing the importance of multiple factors for a 
more comprehensive view of the phenomenon is not unique to systems development and 
extends to information systems research in general” (p. 4).  
Based on the multidimensional aspect of IT and organizational phenomena, 
Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) developed a framework that was used as the scholarly 
framework for this research. For this study, the framework was referenced as the 
dimensions influencing digital government. The framework consists of six dimensions 
starting with a general context covering the environmental features surrounding the 
phenomenon. In the case of cybersecurity posture, this element included “economic, 
political, and social” (p. 507) characteristics affecting the municipal cybersecurity 
posture. On the other hand, the institutional framework consisted of policies such as 
“laws, regulations, norms or any other rule” influencing the cybersecurity posture of 
government municipalities. Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) described this dimension as 
complex and crucial as it defines the legal environment influencing governmental action.  
The interorganizational collaboration dimension encompasses the development 
and sustainment of partnerships with parties who could contribute to advances related to 
the phenomenon. According to Picazo-Vela et al. (2012), the use of professional 
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networks, including nonprofit and private organizations can facilitate problem-solving 
and achieve better solutions. The level of collaboration and networking with other 
organizations could have a significant impact on the cybersecurity posture of 
municipalities. On the contrary, organizational structures and processes consist of the 
internal structure, procedures, and strategic planning of a given organization. Picazo-Vela 
et al. stated that these elements could directly affect the performance of the organization. 
For instance, the centralization or decentralization of cybersecurity-related tasks could 
influence the posture of the organization. Similarly, technical, operational, and 
administrative procedures could have a positive impact on the municipal posture.  
Information is another essential dimension of the conceptual framework. Picazo-
Vela et al. (2012) stressed that “lack of high-quality data or information may cause 
project delays or even failure” (p. 507). In cybersecurity, not having information on how 
to safeguard information resources and data assets could result in a cyber incident or 
compromise. The last dimension encompassed “hardware, software, and infrastructure 
technologies” (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012, p. 507). Access to the appropriate technology 
and the ability to implement it properly are crucial to supporting a resilient cybersecurity 
posture. Also, the use of incompatible and untested technologies is a potential source of 
problems and security challenges (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012).  
Related conceptual frameworks have been applied in previous studies to 
investigate phenomena like cybersecurity. Jiang and Klein (2000) formulated a summary 
of project management risks based on contemporary literature to examine the effect of 
the risks on the distinct phases of system development. Understanding these risks and 
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their impacts can contribute to the development and adoption of controls to mitigate risks 
and improve IT project performance. Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) used this study as the 
foundation for the development of a conceptual framework to capture the factors 
affecting government IT initiatives. The research was aimed at the federal government 
but recognized the importance of developing strategies to advance IT initiatives at the 
state and local government level. Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) categorized key factors 
affecting government IT initiatives into five groups, including “(1) information and data, 
(2) information technology, (3) organizational and managerial, (4) legal and regulatory, 
and (5) institutional and environmental” (p. 190). 
 A few years later, Gil-Garcia et al. (2007) used this framework to investigate “the 
use of comprehensive prototyping” (p. 2) as a method for understanding emerging 
technologies. The factors affecting government IT initiatives provided the framework to 
support the understanding of organizational and social elements affecting systems 
development. Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) developed a 6-layer framework based on the Gil-
Garcia and Pardo’s framework to identify the risks and benefits of social media as a 
government IT initiative. Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) developed a more comprehensive 
framework that consolidated legal and regulatory factors within an institutional 
framework, separated environmental factors into a different dimension, and added a layer 
to account for technology. Figure 2 shows a side by side comparison of the frameworks. 
The concepts applied by Jiang and Klein (2000), Gil-Garcia et al. (2007), and 
Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) proved beneficial for studying phenomena related to IT 
management from a multidimensional perspective. Furthermore, Gil-Garcia et al. (2007) 
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and Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) used these concepts to gain an understanding of the factors 
affecting the management of IT initiatives and new technologies within the government. 
Cybersecurity is a critical multidimensional discipline within IT. The modification made 
by Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) gave the framework the complexity to capture the essence of 
the cybersecurity phenomenon, especially as it relates to the local government. The 
dimensions influencing digital government framework was beneficial to the formulation 
of interview questions, as well as to the collection, organization, analysis, and 
interpretation of research data, and literature. 
Dimensions Influencing Digital Government Factor Affecting Government IT Initiatives 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of conceptual frameworks influencing digital government. Adapted 
from "Understanding Context through a Comprehensive Prototyping,” by J. R. Gil-Garcia, T. 
Pardo, & A. Baker, 2007, Proceedings from HICSS ‘07: Experience: A Testbed Research 
Strategy for Emerging Technologies. 
Literature Review 
NIST defines cybersecurity as “the ability to protect or defend the use of 
cyberspace from cyberattacks” (Kissel, 2013, p. 58). Like NIST, there are many other 
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definitions of cybersecurity. Unfortunately, the absence of a uniform definition can be an 
obstacle for interdisciplinary advances and solutions for addressing the complexity of 
cybersecurity. For these reasons, Craigen et al. (2014) took into consideration some of the 
most commonly accepted definitions of cybersecurity to develop a comprehensive 
interpretation. Craigen et al. (2014) defined the concept of cybersecurity as “organization 
and collection of resources, processes, and structures used to protect cyberspace and 
cyberspace-enabled systems from occurrences that misalign de jure from de facto 
property rights” (Craigen et al., 2014, p. 17). The elements in the dimensions influencing 
digital government are aligned with this definition of cybersecurity. For this reason, the 
dimensions of the framework were used to structure the literature review. Most of the 
articles reviewed utilized qualitative methodology, literature review, and secondary data. 
General Context Influence on Cybersecurity 
According to Picazo-Vela et al. (2012), general context incorporates economic, 
political and social environmental factors. Achieving a common understanding of 
cybersecurity-related concepts is an important component of the general context 
dimension. Kenney (2014) performed a literature review to explore the differences 
between cybersecurity-related concepts such as cyberattacks, cyberwarfare, hacktivism, 
and cyberterrorism. According to Kenney (2014), these concepts share many similarities 
making it difficult to differentiate among them. Under these concepts, the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information systems are attacked using similar strategies, 
while external attributes may be different.  
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External attributes. Kadivar (2014) performed a literature review and used 
expert advice to identify common attributes across the definitions of cyberattacks. In the 
study, five attributes constituting cybersecurity were identified, including actors, assets, 
motivation, effects, and duration. Fok (2015) also used literature review and identified 
similar attributes affecting cybersecurity. According to Fok (2015), actors include 
individuals, organized groups, and nation states. The first group includes hackers, 
amateurs, script kiddies, and people with technical skills looking for “fun or notoriety” 
(Fok, 2015, p. 33). The second groups mixed insider threats and organized groups like 
criminal organizations and hacktivist. The third group includes “terrorist and nation states 
engaged in cyber warfare” (Fok, 2015, p. 33).  
According to a recent report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(2017), Russia as a nation-state performed a cyber intrusion on multiple state and local 
electoral boards systems. Other potential targets consist of different information systems 
and data assets, including critical infrastructure. Miron and Muita (2014) used a literature 
review to study cybersecurity capability maturity models relevant to improving the 
security posture of critical infrastructure providers. Critical infrastructures are “assets or 
systems required for the security and well-being of citizens” (Miron & Muita, 2014, p. 
33). These systems support and provide “energy, transportation, telecommunication, 
water supply and waste management, agriculture and food supply, finance, public health, 
and essential government services” (Hua & Bapna, 2013, p. 175). On the other hand, 
motivations can consist of individual beliefs or shared ideals that could be influenced by 
economic, political, and social factors. The effects of a cyberattack can include 
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“alteration, deletion, corruption, deception, degradation, disablement, disruption, or 
destruction of assets” (Kadivar, 2014, p. 23).  
Economic. According to Kadivar (2014), the government, the private sector, and 
academia are aware of the high cost related to cyberattacks and vulnerabilities 
management. The public and private sectors are reducing operational cost through 
automation and system integration. On the other hand, these sectors had increased their 
yearly spending on cybersecurity (Clinton, 2015). The private sector is spending more 
than “$100 billion”, while the federal government spends less than “$15 billion” (Clinton, 
2015, p. 55). These investments can result in a major challenge for most government 
agencies, particularly those with small populations (Saxby, 2015).  
Cyberattacks can force the deviation of government funds from public services to 
respond and recovery efforts related to the attack (Hua & Bapna, 2013). For instance, a 
cyberattack against the Departamento de Hacienda de Puerto Rico (Hacienda) 
[Department of Treasury of Puerto Rico] had a cost of $30 million per day (Minelli-
Pérez, 2017). The online tax payment system was unavailable for five days preventing 
the submission of 46,000 individual tax records and payments, thus causing a significant 
impact on government revenues (Tellado-Domenech, 2017). Responding and recovering 
from a cyberattack can lead to unanticipated expenditure resulting in a decrease of 
government service, budget deficit, and the need to increase taxes.  
Political. Rowland, Rice, and Shenoi (2014) conducted a literature review to 
explain the concepts of cyber power, its components, and characteristics, as well as their 
importance in achieving and maintaining power. Cyberspace is a relatively new domain 
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that offers “speed and reach, anonymity and protection, and the ability to create and 
participate in virtual economies” (Rowland et al., 2014, p. 3). The ideologies of a cyber 
state include the concept of digital citizenship where e-government and e-economy 
models are used to satisfy their social contract supporting the economy and social 
stability, as well as to provide services related health, education, and public safety, 
among other elements (Rowland et al., 2014).  
Saxby (2015) used a seminar composed of presentations “followed by a panel-
based question and answer session” (p. 164) to explore the meaning of digital citizen and 
its implication on policy. Internet technologies are providing the means to bridge the 
communication gap between the government and its constituents (Saxby, 2015). Digital 
citizenship encompasses a sense of community, right to participate, and the commitment 
to take part in civic matters. However, recent incents such as Russia’s cyber intrusion on 
state and local systems can affect people trust on these digital platforms (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2017).  
The Government of Puerto Rico uses Internet technologies to facilitate the 
delivery of public services. For instance, Hacienda uses information systems to manage 
lottery and tax services. Recently, this agency was the target of a cyberattack, and PII 
from taxpayers could have been compromised as part of the cyber incident (Minelli-
Pérez, 2017). Elmaghraby and Losavio (2014) stressed the importance of using “legal and 
technical security measures” (p. 496) to preserve confidentially and privacy. For these 
reasons, Saxby (2015) identified cybersecurity as a critical element in provisioning 
government services and supporting the concept of a cyber state.  
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Social. Cybersecurity is a societal concern like public safety (Elmaghraby & 
Losavio, 2014; Levesque, Walsh, & Whyte, 2015). Elmaghraby and Losavio (2014) used 
literature review to examine cybersecurity challenges in smart cities. The concept of 
smart cities expands on the idea of digital citizens by benefiting from new technology, 
including “energy meters, security devices, smart appliances,” among other devices 
(Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014, p. 491). These systems support public services, including 
water, sanitation, emergency response, and disaster recovery (Elmaghraby & Losavio, 
2014). According to Kenney (2014), the United States is the target of “hundreds of 
thousands of cyberattacks,” (p. 112) especially against the Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems supporting critical infrastructure.  
Hiller and Russell (2013) performed a literature review to explore the 
cybersecurity conditions, approaches, and legal framework used in the United States and 
the European Union. According to the study, “25% of all power companies globally have 
been hacked by cybercriminals” (Hiller & Russell, 2013, p. 237). In early 2000, a 
SCADA system was attacked in Australia resulting in the “release 800,000 gallons of raw 
sewage into adjacent rivers, parks and the grounds of a nearby hotel, destroying marine 
life and creating a nauseating stench for local residents” (Kenney, 2014, p.124). Similar 
attacks against SCADA systems have occurred in other countries such as Azerbaijan, 
Germany, Georgia, and Turkey (Levesque et al., 2015).  
Influence of Institutional Frameworks on Cybersecurity 
The institutional framework serves a legal framework covering policies, directly 
and indirectly, related to cybersecurity. The primary concern with this dimension is the 
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absence of policies covering technology (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). According to Bertot 
et al.’ (2015) literature review of information security policy and governance, “the legal 
structures, frameworks, authorization, and powers regarding national and international 
security” (p. 105) are continuously evolving. Tehrani et al. (2013) took advantage of case 
studies to examine the jurisdictional aspect of cybersecurity. Based on the study, Tehrani 
et al. affirmed that cybercrime could not be prevented, but it can be deterred through 
legal frameworks and prosecution. Information security policies are essential to provide a 
legal framework capable of safeguard organization, nations, and international boundaries. 
Government agencies are ruled by the laws and regulations establishing their 
mission and defining the context of their operational environment. Therefore, policies can 
serve as a vehicle to influence the cybersecurity posture of government agencies. FISMA 
of 2014 is the primary law defining the cybersecurity requirements and mandating 
compliance with “related policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines” (p. 128). This 
statue gives regulatory power to OMB which exercises its responsibility in the form of 
circulars, memorandums, and defined reporting mechanism. Further, FISMA of 2014 
assigns NIST the responsibility of developing guidelines in the form of Special 
Publications (SP) and Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) to safeguard the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of national systems. However, these policies are 
not mandated outside the federal government.  
Local governments are “creatures of the states” (Levy, 2012, p. 68) receiving their 
mandates and much of their funding from the state government. E-Government Act of 
2004 is the primary law driving the use of IT to promote e-governance in Puerto Rico. 
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The key objectives of this Act are represented in Figure 3. The pyramid shows the 
interrelationship of the E-Government Act of 2004 objectives acting as building blocks 
leading to empower citizens to be able and capable of participating in the different 
aspects of democratic governance. The law requires these objectives to be achieved while 
ensuring the protection of privacy, security, and availability of the information. 
Therefore, the principles of cybersecurity serve as the foundation supporting all e-
government goals and objectives. Like FISMA of 2014, the E-Government Act of 2004 
mandates OGP to coordinate access to information and government services with all 
agencies. Moreover, OGP is responsible for developing and establishing policies and 
guidelines for the protection of privacy and cybersecurity. The E-Government Act of 
2004 uses a similar policy framework as FISMA of 2014 by including circulars, 
memorandums, and guidelines.  
Roesener et al. (2014) performed a qualitative study of information security 
policy in the United States to understand the different roles, responsibilities, and 
authorities influencing the national cybersecurity posture. Roesener et al. found that the 
roles and responsibilities of government agencies are overlapping and lacking authority 
to make decisions (Roesener et al., 2014). Similarly, the E-Government Act of 2004 is 
considered vague, especially regarding the role and responsibility of government 
agencies to support e-government (Certificates and Electronic Receipts Act; 3 L.P.R.A. § 
8721). The vagueness of the law resulted in the development and enactment of additional 
legislation to cover the gaps. OGP developed an ongoing series of policies known as TIG 
to provide additional guidance to fulfill the mandate of the E-Government Act of 2004.  
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Figure 3. Puerto Rico’s e-government goals. Adapted from the E-Government Act of 2004, 3 
L.P.R.A. § 991 (2004). 
The TIG-003, Security of Information Systems is the foundation supporting the 
cybersecurity posture of government agencies in Puerto Rico. This policy established the 
general guidelines to facilitate the implementation of security controls by government 
agencies and support the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems 
and data assets under their jurisdiction. According to TIG-003, security is an integral part 
of the system design. However, the policy does not mention audits, timelines, or 
processes to review compliance at the municipal level.  
In 2016, 12 years after the implementation of TIG-003 the Office of the 
Comptroller of Puerto Rico issued a circular (OC-16-16) to evaluate the security controls 
implemented in municipal information systems. TIG-003 introduced several critical 
aspects supporting cybersecurity that are aligned with the elements of this research and 
Increase Citizen Participation
Promote Digital Literacy
Ensure Socially Inclusiveness
Improve Services to Citizens 
Achieve Full Potential of Social, 
Cultural and Commercial Information
Promote Interagency Collaboration 
Efficient Government Procurement
Reduce Costs and Burdens
Protection of Privacy, Security, and 
Availability
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are discussed in more detail under other TIGs. Appendix A: Cybersecurity Dimensions 
Covered by TIGs shows some of the cybersecurity elements covered by TIGs. Kazemi et 
al. (2012) used a mixed method case study to evaluate the success factors related to 
municipal information security programs. Kazemi et al. identified compliance with 
security standards as an important factor for the successful implementation of 
information security programs. Nevertheless, most of the TIG series failed to reference 
government and industry standards, as well as to provide detailed guidance. 
Executive orders have also played a significant role within the institutional 
frameworks supporting the cybersecurity posture of government agencies in Puerto Rico. 
Before the enactment of the E-government Act of 2004, the government used Executive 
Order OE-2000-019 to establish CIOs at the agency level. However, Executive Order 
OE-2000-019 did not create a central office for managing standards, compliance, or 
guidance to help the new CIOs in managing their information resources in a uniform and 
secure manner. This situation led to incompatibilities among agencies information 
systems causing roadblocks, duplicative efforts, and costly solutions. Further, these 
conditions affected the transferability and availability of data among agencies to improve 
the management and delivery of public services. 
In 2009, OE-2009-009 was passed establishing the role of the CIO of Puerto Rico 
and the Oficina del Principal Ejecutivo de Información del Gobierno de Puerto Rico 
[Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) of Puerto Rico]. The primary 
responsibilities of the CIO were advising the governor and acting as the governor’s 
representative in all IT-related matters. The order made OCIO responsible for performing 
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accountability of all government information systems to facilitate system integration; 
identifying and reducing duplicative efforts; lowering operational cost and improving 
public services. OCIO was also mandated to develop, implement, and publish policies, 
standards, and best practices to protect government systems from cyber threats. The 
office had a dedicated budget and the ability to manage federal, state, and local funds.  
During 2015, Executive Order OE-2015-019 (2015) was ratified to repeal 
Executive Order OE-2009-009 (2009). The order recognized the success of the OCIO in 
fulfilling their mandates. Nevertheless, Executive Order OE-2015-019 (2015) eliminated 
the role of the CIO of Puerto Rico, dismantled the OCIO, and reassigned its duties to the 
DDEC. The executive order was justified from the perspective of economic development 
and did not consider the impact on public administration and management of government 
systems. On January 2017, the newly elected administration used an executive order to 
reestablish the OCIO under the name of Servicio de Tecnología de Innovación de Puerto 
Rico [Technology and Innovation Service of Puerto Rico]. 
Influence of Interorganizational Collaboration on Cybersecurity 
The interorganizational dimension covers the collaboration and networking efforts 
that interact with external organizations within the government and private sector 
(Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). The interconnectivity of information systems continues to 
have a transformational impact on public safety, critical infrastructure, global commerce, 
and access to near real-time data (Hiller & Russell, 2013; Levesque et al., 2015; 
Lozowski, 2014). However, the complexity of interconnection requires the government to 
go beyond securing their systems and helping safeguard interconnected systems. Scholars 
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agree that the government alone cannot secure cyberspace and needs the support and 
collaboration of other sectors (Clinton, 2015; Hiller & Russell, 2013; Hua & Bapna, 
2013; Miron & Muita, 2014; Roesener et al., 2014). 
Unfortunately, government agencies tend to act independently and fail to take into 
consideration what is being done by other entities (Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005).  
Manley (2015) reviewed secondary data, including previous studies, surveys, and 
interviews related to cybersecurity and PPPs. Manley (2015) explained that government 
officials such as former U.S. President Obama and former CIA Director Panetta 
recognized the importance of PPP to improve the national cybersecurity posture. Early 
policy efforts such as the Presidential Decision Directive 63 had also recognized the 
importance of public and private collaboration as part of a national cybersecurity 
framework (Hiller & Russell, 2013).  
More recent policy efforts like the 2009’s Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 
Initiative included increasing cooperation between “federal, state, local and private sector 
actors,” (Hiller & Russell, 2013, p. 239) supported education and research and defined 
clearer roles among partners. Similarly, HSPD 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection and its successor PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security 
and Resilience promoted collaboration among the industry, the research community, and 
government agencies, including state and local governments (Roesener et al., 2014). The 
Government of Puerto Rico has also encouraged interorganizational collaboration 
through legislation such as the E-Government Act of 2004 and related policies. The 
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deprecated OE-2009-009 gave the OCIO of Puerto Rico the responsibilities for IT-related 
interorganizational collaboration with municipal, state, and federal agencies.  
Clinton (2015) used case studies to analyze the strategies related to the success 
and failure of PPPs. Policy can be used as a strategy to require government agencies to 
work collectively with the private sector, especially “to identify industry-based standards 
and practices worthy of voluntary adoption” (Clinton, 2015, p. 56). Yusta et al. (as cited 
by Miron & Muita, 2014) mentioned that “standards bodies and federal agencies in at 
least 12 countries or regions have defined criteria for security standards as well as 
implementation methods” (p. 34) to lessen the complexity of risk management. PPPs can 
help to achieve “a common lexicon for categorizing and managing cyber risks” that could 
facilitate “a common understanding around various risk management terms, 
methodologies, ideas, and language” (Clinton, 2015, p. 67).  
Department of Homeland Security and Carnegie Mellon University are an 
example of a PPP promoting advancement in cybersecurity through “workforce 
development, process maturity, and operational resilience” (Miron & Muita, 2014, p. 36). 
Similarly, municipalities could establish partnerships with local universities. Kostyuk 
(2014) used a case study to understand challenges related to cybersecurity and explore 
cooperation as a strategy to address them. Based on the study, small public agencies such 
as municipalities should partner with other organizations to strengthen their capabilities 
and collectively improve their cybersecurity posture (Kostyuk, 2014).  
Collaboration can help improve problem-solving and public services through 
knowledge and best practice sharing (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
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interorganizational collaboration can take place at all levels from municipal to 
international organizations. Tehrani et al. (2013) used literature review to study 
cyberattacks such as cyberterrorism from a multijurisdictional perspective. Since 
cyberattacks can occur across borders, there is a need for a global response. At the 
international level, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) sponsored the International 
Multilateral Partnership against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) which became “the world’s 
first global PPP against cyber threats” (Tehrani et al., 2013, p. 214). This alliance 
includes 191 countries collaborating and sharing threats “against the global financial 
system, power grids, nuclear plants, and air traffic control systems” (p. 214).  
Douba, Rütten, Scheidl, Soble, and Walsh (2014) linked a transdisciplinary model 
with the prospect theory as a strategy to support risk-based decision making to explore 
the concept of online safety, its impact, and possible approaches to addressing related 
concerns. According to Douba et al. (2014), collaboration must occur across different 
levels. Practical solutions must account for the value level, which encompasses 
“theology, values, security and privacy, intellectual property, regulation, disclosure, and 
the individual and collective good” (Douba et al., p. 43, 2014). On the other hand, the 
normative level consists of “risk-based decision-making, management and planning, the 
strategy for making scientific progress and knowledge sharing, legal, and political 
concerns” (Douba et al., p. 43, 2014). The 2011’s U.S. International Strategy for 
Cyberspace included collaboration in similar areas to facilitate “1) establishing risk-based 
security practices, 2) information sharing, 3) adopting international technical security 
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standards for products and services” (Hiller & Russell, 2013, p. 239). PPPs should serve 
as a model for interorganizational collaboration on cybersecurity that can be implemented 
throughout different government level, including municipalities.  
Influence of Organizational Structures and Processes on Cybersecurity 
The organizational dimension includes the impact of structures and processes on 
the organization’s performance (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). Bertot et al. (2015) described 
prevention and response as critical cybersecurity processes. The former allows 
organizations to manage risk before it happens while the later gives organizations the 
ability to react. The capabilities to prevent and respond to cyber threats are directly 
related to the organization’s structures, resources, technologies, and policies. 
Organizational structures. On a centralized structure, the body of governance is 
responsible for cybersecurity processes such as managing controls, awareness, and 
training. On the contrary, under a decentralized structure, these responsibilities fall under 
individuals or small groups with limited resources. Armbruster, Endicott-Popovskyb, and 
Whittington (2013) used a case study to investigate the impact of aging infrastructure on 
municipal systems. Armbruster et al. (2013) discovered that the development of 
standards, the adoption methodologies, and the implementation of best practices is more 
challenging for decentralized IT departments.  
Moreover, Flores, Antonsen, and Ekstedt (2013) used a mixed methods research 
including literature review and surveys to collect data from 578 information security 
executives within the United States and Sweden. According to a recent study by Flores et 
al. (2013), centralization is more efficient to achieve uniform guidance and facilitate 
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information sharing. The way the organization interacts is also crucial in supporting 
cybersecurity. Manley (2015) explained that implementing a bottom-up approach is 
fundamental to fulfilling legal requirements and support collaboration. Previous 
investigation has shown that the use of a top-down approach placed more attention on the 
organization at the top while a bottom-up approach gives “autonomy to react quicker to 
cyberattacks, thus being more resilient” (Manley, 2015, p. 95).  
The people, their roles, and their responsibilities are also essential elements of the 
organizational structure. Kazemi et al. (2012) identified seven organizational factors 
required for the successful implementation of an information security program at the 
municipal level. These factors are “top management support, information security policy, 
job responsibilities, the motivation of the employees, awareness and training programs, 
compliance with information security international standards, and using the services of 
the information security external advisors” (p. 4982). Reece and Stahl (2015) performed a 
qualitative study to examine cybersecurity as a profession and investigated the 
perspectives of practitioners on the profession. Reece and Stahl identified the need for top 
management to include the role of a cybersecurity executive such as a chief information 
security officer (CISO) with the responsibility of incorporating cybersecurity as part of 
the enterprise governance (Reece & Stahl, 2015). The CISO or IT leaders with 
cybersecurity responsibilities must understand the organizational culture as part of policy 
development and implementation (Flores et al., 2013; Kazemi et al., 2012). For instance, 
organizations, where employees are hesitant to take ownership of cybersecurity efforts, 
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there must be defined roles and responsibilities. A lesson learned after the cyberattack 
against Hacienda was the lack of a CISO role in the agency(Minelli-Pérez, 2017).  
Kazemi et al. (2012) mentioned the importance of employee motivation to support 
cybersecurity. IT professionals are constantly defending their organizations from 
cyberattacks, but their roles are not considered heroic. Nugent and Collar (2015) affirmed 
that it is hard to differentiate their heroism versus the perception that the IT professionals 
are just performing their job. This situation can negatively impact the motivation of 
employees and the attractiveness of the career for new practitioners. The demand for 
cybersecurity professionals is over three times greater than the offer (Levesque et al., 
2015; Reece & Stahl, 2015). IT leaders can take advantage of organizational heroes to 
create a positive effect on job satisfaction. With the continuous increase in cyber threats, 
it is important to maintain job attractiveness for the current and upcoming workforce.  
Organizational processes. Elmaghraby and Losavio (2014) used a combination 
of literature, a paradigm developed by IBM, and the routine activities theory to examine 
the relationship and challenges of cybersecurity in smart cities. According to the routine 
activity theory, identifying suitable targets can lead to the development of technical, 
operational, and administrative controls and processes to serve as capable guardians for 
deterring attackers and preventing the success of their actions (Elmaghraby & Losavio, 
2014). For these reasons, security controls must include processes for “prevention, 
detection, and recovery” (Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014, p. 496). Kazemi et al. (2012) 
described information security programs as an iterative process, requiring “feedback and 
continuous improvement” (p. 4984) to reduce the risks originating from cyber threats. 
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Further, the process requires prevention and detection elements such as identifying 
security controls and assessing their effectiveness.  
Organizations rely on frameworks, standards, and best practices to model their 
security programs. However, a blanket implementation of these frameworks fails to place 
“attention to the differences between organizations and their information security 
requirements” (Flores et al., 2013, p. 91). For instance, municipalities often serve as 
critical infrastructure providers and are subject to numerous security controls and 
standards (Miron & Muita, 2014). Furthermore, Rogers (as cited by Miron & Muita, 
2014) mentioned that organizations like municipalities could “be seen as laggards” (p. 
37) on adopting standards. Kazemi et al. (2012) explained that smaller organizations face 
significant challenges due to their lack of resources.  
The implementation of security controls, standards, frameworks, and best 
practices are complex, costly, and time-consuming process (Miron & Muita, 2014). Hua 
and Bapna (2013) reviewed current literature about “cyber terrorism, terrorism 
deterrence, IS security investment, and prior studies on game theoretical models” (p. 176) 
to explore key factors affecting cybersecurity investment. Hua and Bapna said that cost-
effective investments could improve resiliency, reduce risk, and potential negative impact 
on the organization’s systems and reputation. For example, subsidizing cybersecurity 
investments, certifying compliance, performing periodic audits, and sharing lessons 
learned can be used by the government to improve their cybersecurity posture. 
Nevertheless, budget constraints can influence the procurement of IT services based on 
cost rather than best value (Armbruster et al., 2013).  
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Another important factor to consider is the organizational process for remediating 
vulnerabilities. Controls such as “policies and procedures for security, technical 
solutions, and contracts with suppliers, service providers, and customers” (Hiller & 
Russell, 2013, p. 237) are essential to mitigate vulnerabilities. Hua and Bapna (2013) 
stressed the importance of addressing technical and administrative vulnerabilities to 
increase the effectiveness of cybersecurity investments. Asset management is a crucial 
element in vulnerability management. Asset management includes the procedures for 
conducting inventory on municipal assets, allocation of resources, capital planning, and 
the forecasting of resources and requirements while complying with pertinent regulations 
(Armbruster et al., 2013). Unfortunately, asset management could be constrained by the 
absence of the resources to support the process.  
Influence of Information and Data on Cybersecurity 
The information and data dimension encompass elements such as availability, 
integrity, completeness, and quality of data assets (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012). The lack of 
high-quality data was a contributing factor affecting IT projects. Similarly, information 
and data deficiency could have an impact on cybersecurity operations. Cybersecurity is 
“a human-centered process, fully informed by both technical and social aspects” (Reece 
& Stahl, 2015, p. 182). For this reason, attackers are concentrating on social components 
over technical vulnerabilities (Flores et al., 2013). Adams and Makramalla (2015) 
explored gamification and entrepreneurial perspectives as strategies to strength awareness 
training and improve resiliency against human exploits. As part of their literature review, 
Adams and Makramalla highlighted recent studies showing that 80% of cybersecurity 
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exploits are related to the human element. Therefore, it is critical to consider the 
accessibility, availability, and completeness of the data needed to help end users and IT 
professionals secure their organizations and improve their cybersecurity posture.  
According to a recent report, 24% of participants stated that the effectiveness of 
their organizations in dealing with cyber incidents has declined (Lozowski, 2015). 
Scholars agree that most security programs lack the methodology and empirical data to 
measure their effectiveness (Flores et al., 2013). The lack of empirical data affects the 
ability of IT leaders to understand and improve the cybersecurity posture of their 
organizations. Methodologies such as such cybersecurity capability maturity models can 
be used for measuring hierarchical progress related to “conditions, processes, or 
application targets” (Miron & Muita, 2014, p. 36). These measurements can capture 
historical performance data in alignment with defined maturity levels. This information 
can then be used to support the development of strategies to move the organization into a 
more desirable state. 
Douba et al. (2014) affirmed that there is a relationship between digital literacy 
and cyber resiliency. Unfortunately, there is limited access to “highly qualified 
personnel” (Levesque et al., 2015, p. 29) with an appropriate level of cybersecurity 
knowledge and experience. Personnel without an appropriate level of expertise could 
have an adverse impact on their organization’s security posture. Insiders with legitimate 
"access to an organization’s information or information systems” (Posey, Roberts, 
Lowry, & Hightower, 2014, p. 551) can commit inadvertent actions such as 
unintentionally activate a malicious payload.  
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The cyberattack against Hacienda used a human exploit strategy know as 
ransomware where someone internal inadvertently clicked on a malicious payload that 
encrypted a portion of the agency’s data assets prohibiting access to the systems and data 
(Tellado-Domenech, 2017). Chen and Dongre (2014) performed a qualitative study to 
understand the motives of attackers to develop better controls to protect systems. In 
addition to inadvertent actions, insiders can have motives to deliberately commit actions 
with malicious intent (Chen & Dongre, 2014). One of the most dangerous actions is 
inaction. According to a recent study, 54% of data compromises occurred during 2013 
were related to negligence (Adams & Makramalla, 2015).  
Douba et al. (2014) identified seven knowledge domains that are necessary for 
online safety, including knowledge transfer or information sharing. Information sharing 
supports advancement in “cybersecurity tools and techniques” (Levesque et al., 2015, p. 
30). Information sharing is the distribution of information to facilitate collaboration, 
problem-solving, innovation, and implementation of governance (Flores et al., 2013). 
Flores et al. (2013) revealed that the participants in their study affirmed coordination of 
security activities affects information sharing, particularly related to “risk management 
and performance monitoring” (p. 97).  
Conducting security assessments requires the coordination of security activities. 
For instance, the vulnerabilities discovered during security assessments must be shared 
with the proper personnel for remediation. Failure to properly communicate these 
findings can place the organization at risk of cyberattacks. Muegge and Craigen (2015) 
used a combination of secondary data, conversations with practitioners, and the 
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perceptions of graduate students within a design science approach for developing a 
process for improving the quality and dissemination of risk data. Muegge and Craigen 
affirmed that elements such as “secrecy, competition, and public image” (Muegge & 
Craigen, 2015) serve as deterring factors to information sharing affecting the 
organization’s ability to learn, manage, and mitigate cyber threats.  
PricewaterhouseCoopers reported that the annual losses of organizations without 
cybersecurity awareness training reported an average of 76% higher losses than those 
organizations that provided training (Adams & Makramalla, 2015). Posey et al. (2014) 
conducted qualitative semistructured interviews with 33 participants, including 11 
insiders and 22 security professionals from different organizations within the United 
States to compare their perceptions on cybersecurity-related matters. The findings make 
of security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs an essential part of the 
organization’s security program (Posey et al., 2014). The use of appropriate awareness 
training could have served as a mitigation control to deter the success of the cyberattack 
against Hacienda. Nevertheless, awareness training alone does not provide adequate 
means to develop the necessary skills to protect organizations (Adams & Makramalla, 
2015; Reece & Stahl, 2015). Strategies such as gamification facilitate information 
dissemination and understanding allowing participants to increase their skills to prevent 
and mitigate cyber threats (Adams & Makramalla, 2015). Employees should have a clear 
understanding of the organization’s cybersecurity goals and “that security is everybody’s 
job” (Posey et al., 2014, p. 565). 
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Influence of Technology on Cybersecurity 
The technology dimension consists of information systems components, as well 
as their compatibility, usage, and management (Picazo-Vela et al., 2012, p.107). 
Technology represents both threats and opportunities. Levesque et al. (2015) completed a 
qualitative study on the challenges inhibiting cybersecurity. According to Levesque et al., 
complexity is a key factor affecting cybersecurity. Cisco projected a total of 50 billion 
devices connected to the Internet by 2020 (Levesque et al., 2015). The increase in 
systems interconnectivity introduces “new vulnerabilities, adversarial threats, and 
challenges” (Levesque et al., 2015, p. 26) affecting the security of the systems and related 
data. Further, technology gives attackers the ability to target information systems from 
anywhere in the world. Failing to understand these challenges and adapt to new 
technologies could have adverse effects on government operations and their constituents.  
On the other hand, new technologies also represent opportunities to manage, 
mitigate, prevent, and respond to cyber threats. Levesque et al. (2015) identified seven 
factors to improve the cybersecurity posture of organizations, three of which were related 
to the use of cybersecurity-related technologies. The use of antivirus, firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS), among other security 
appliances, is essential to prevent and respond to cyberattacks (Hua & Bapna, 2013; 
Levesque et al., 2015). Furthermore, the implementation of systems capable of 
automatically responding to cyberattacks without human interaction is crucial to 
improving the organization’s cybersecurity posture (Kostyuk, 2014; Levesque et al., 
2015). For instance, an IDS is only capable of detection and notification, while an IPS 
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can apply learned patterns and analysis to respond to cyberattacks automatically. 
According to a recent report, Russia access to state and local system since 2014 was 
discovered by U.S. intelligence instead of the people responsible for the systems (Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). The use of cybersecurity technology 
solutions can help to identify and prevent cyber intrusion.  
These technologies are expensive and could require hiring personnel with 
specialized capabilities or reeducate the current staff. However, the effect of cyberattacks 
against government institutions could be even more costly. For instance, the impact of the 
recent cyberattack against Hacienda has been estimated to cost over $30 million without 
counting the recovery and remediation efforts (Minelli-Pérez, 2017). Maheux (2014) 
merged an intention-based classification of malware and an optimal timing model as a 
tool to “help predict the timing of malware based on its classification” (p. 34). Maheux 
(2014), emphasized a recent report by Symantec explaining that the annual impact of 
cybercrime exceeds $110 billion and affects 566 million victims. Kadivar (2014) 
examined 10 high-profile cyberattacks and identified six attributes in common, including 
vector, vulnerability, malicious software, botnet reliance, origin, and destination. The 
attack vector is the entry point to commit “the exploitation” (Kadivar, 2014, p. 24). 
Malicious software or malware includes the “viruses, worms, trojan horses, and spyware” 
(Maheux, 2014, p. 34) used to commit cyberattacks. Ransomware was the malware used 
on the cyberattack against Hacienda. This type of malware encrypts data assets and 
request payment to decrypt the data and regain access to the information.  
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These technologies have continued to improve their capability to bypass 
detection, replicate, and open covert channels to establish command and control (Hua & 
Bapna, 2013). Zeus is an example of malware stealth to antiviruses that compromised 
over 74,000 accounts in 2007 from “Bank of America, NASA, Monster.com, ABC, 
Oracle, Cisco, Amazon, and BusinessWeek” (Maheux, 2014, p. 35) causing economic 
losses of over $70 million. Maheux (2014) merged an intention-based classification of 
malware and an optimal timing model as a tool to “help predict the timing of malware 
based on its classification” (p. 34). In the case of the cyberattack against Hacienda, this 
timing of malware could have helped predict that an agency responsible for collecting 
taxes have a higher probability to be attacked during tax season. Understanding the 
relationship between the timing, categorization, and intention of malware can improve 
the ability to defend information systems resources and data assets. 
Sá et al. (2015) used convenience sampling to identify 25 participants for a 20-
minute questionnaire about local e-government. Sá et al. explained that e-government 
consists of the implementation of technological solutions to enable communication and 
services with internal and external parties such as constituents, other government 
agencies, and the private sector. This approach has increased the government’s 
dependency on “energy and computing infrastructures” (Armbruster et al., 2013, p.123) 
to support e-government and e-democracy. Armbruster et al. (2013) used a case study 
approach to explore the impact of a cyber incident related to aging infrastructure and 
raised awareness on the importance of protecting critical systems. Based on the study, 
Armbruster et al. recommend hosting data centers with appropriate infrastructure and 
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avoid “repurposing buildings that were not intended to accommodate the requirements of 
critical computing infrastructures” (p. 124). 
Information systems must be resilient to human-made and natural disasters. 
Therefore, government agencies need to identify contingency strategies to support their 
critical systems and operations. A recent survey showed that out 71% of organizations 
with tested business continuity plans, half reported: “technical, equipment, logistical or 
management problems during an exercise” (Armbruster et al., 2013, p. 125). During the 
attack against Hacienda, it was discovered that contingency planning and testing was not 
performed contributing to the loss of 50 terabytes of data because of the attack (Minelli-
Pérez, 2017). Developing and managing contingency plans can be costly and difficult for 
government agencies to maintain after budget cuts. Cloud services can also facilitate 
disaster recovery and continuity of operations, improving the resilience of systems and 
processes. The U.S. General Services Administration is leading an initiative to 
consolidate 40% of the federal agencies’ data centers to reduce operational costs and 
facilitate technical improvements. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The literature surrounding cybersecurity has continued to expand and contribute 
to the body of knowledge. However, research attention continues to focus on 
cybersecurity at the national and international level. Local governments use the same data 
types to fulfill their mandates as first responders, critical infrastructure providers, and 
enablers for social and economic development within their jurisdiction (Miron & Muita, 
2014; Sylves, 2015). These data assets reside within cyberspace and depend on 
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interconnectivity to other systems. Attacks against these information resources can 
adversely affect the operations of the targeted, as well as the interconnected systems. 
These conditions should drive more attention toward cybersecurity at the local level.  
The literature search strategy concentrated on the research problem and not in the 
conceptual framework. However, the major themes found during the literature review 
were in alignment with the dimensions influencing digital government. Also, most of the 
literature was consistent with themes within the predefined dimensions. For instance, the 
elements captured within the general context dimensions included economic, political, 
and social factors. These factors played a significant role in understanding cyberattack 
attributes such as objectives, actors, and targets (Fok, 2015; Kadivar, 2014; Kenney, 
2014). Regarding the institutional framework, the literature supports the need for 
standards and information security policies (Armbruster et al., 2013; Clinton, 2015; 
Flores et al., 2013; Hiller & Russell, 2013; Kazemi et al., 2012; Miron & Muita, 2014; 
Picazo-Vela et al., 2012; Tehrani et al., 2013). 
System interconnectivity and limited resources were major themes under 
interorganizational collaboration and networks. As technology continues to evolve, more 
systems are interconnected. This characteristic improves productivity but expands the 
surface of attack to include vulnerabilities in the interconnections and the interconnected 
systems (Hiller & Russell, 2013; Levesque et al., 2015; Lozowski, 2014). On the other 
hand, interorganizational collaboration can improve problem-solving, reduce 
administrative overhead, and benefit from the strength of other organizations to 
collectively improve cybersecurity (Flores et al., 2013; Picazo-Vela et al. (2012). The 
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literature favored the use of centralized organizational structures and bottom-up 
communication for achieving and supporting a resilient cybersecurity posture 
(Armbruster et al., 2013; Flores et al., 2013; Manley, 2015). Most of the organizational 
processes found during the literature review were related to the concepts of prevention, 
detection, and recovery (Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014; Kazemi et al., 2012). 
The literature also supported the importance of information and data in achieving 
a resilient cybersecurity posture. Information about the security policies, cyber threats, 
and mitigation strategies needs to be available, accessible and well disseminated (Douba 
et al., 2014; Flores et al., 2013; Hiller & Russell, 2013; Levesque et al., 2015; Muegge & 
Craigen, 2015). Similarly, technology must be available, procured, and properly 
configured. Scholars agree on the importance of the implementation of cybersecurity-
related technologies, especially those capable of automatically responding to cyberattacks 
without human interaction (Hua & Bapna, 2013; Kostyuk, 2014; Levesque et al., 2015). 
Most of the literature concentrated on identifying missing technical, operational, 
and administrative controls, and providing possible solutions to improve cybersecurity. 
For instance, information security policies, collaboration, cybersecurity processes, 
information sharing, awareness and training, and cybersecurity-related technologies were 
some of the controls identified in literature needing to be developed, implemented, or 
improved to achieve a resilient posture. However, the literature did not explore why these 
security controls were not present or why these possible solutions were not implemented 
in the first place. Understanding what is affecting the local government’s ability to 
achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture could help to identify the groundwork required 
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to upkeep the development and implementations of cybersecurity controls which 
consequentially could improve and maintain their posture.  
This study could contribute to the resolution of two major gaps in the literature. 
The first gap is the absence of cybersecurity research outside a national and international 
context. This study provided research-based data on the cybersecurity posture of local 
governments. The second gap is related to the factors affecting the development and 
implementation of security controls. The literature contained evidence of the use of 
security controls to improve cybersecurity. However, the literature lacked focus on the 
challenges and factors affecting the adoption of such security controls. Understanding 
these factors is essential for the development of cost-effective solutions that are suitable 
for each local government agency. These contributions could extend knowledge in public 
policy, public administration, and IT management. 
The following chapter describes the research methods for this study. The research 
methodology is in alignment with the gap discovered during the literature review. A 
significant portion of the literature was solely based on a literature review with no 
additional connection to participants. Several researchers took advantage of case studies, 
interviews, and expert advice as part of their methodology. Based on the significant gap 
in literature and knowledge about cybersecurity at the local government level, a 
qualitative phenomenological approach could be crucial to extend knowledge in the 
discipline by studying information-rich cases to collect as much data as possible about 
the phenomenon. Chapter 3 included detailed descriptions of the research design, the 
researcher’s role, methodology, and strategies to address potential trustworthiness issues. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The research design for this study facilitated the understanding of the 
cybersecurity posture of municipalities in Puerto Rico. This phenomenon involved the 
readiness of municipal governments’ “networks, information, and systems based on IA 
resources (e.g., people, processes, technologies) and capabilities in place to manage the 
defense of the enterprise and to react as the situation changes” (Kissel, 2013, p. 179). 
Furthermore, this study addressed key factors influencing the cybersecurity posture of 
municipalities. The outcomes of this investigation may help to improve the cybersecurity 
of government agencies in Puerto Rico by providing advances in knowledge that could 
support the development of administrative, operational, and technical controls.  
Phenomenology was the qualitative design used to conduct the study. This design 
is used to explore the human experience with the phenomenon (Moustakas, 1994). The 
study included a transcendental approach to concentrate on the essence of the experiences 
of IT leaders. The understanding of the phenomenon and related elements was gained 
through the perceptions of public servants leading IT efforts at the municipal level. A 
sample of this population was drawn from settings consisting of highly populated 
municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA.  
This chapter includes the rationale for the research design, the role of the 
researcher, the methodology, and issues related to trustworthiness. The design rationale 
includes the reasoning for using transcendental phenomenology for the study. Bracketing 
was used to explain my experience with the phenomenon and manage biases. The 
methodology section includes comprehensive details about the selection of participants, 
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the research instrument, data collection, and data analysis. Also, this chapter addresses 
ethical concerns and mitigation strategies to support the trustworthiness of the study. 
Research Design and Rationale 
The research questions supported the purpose of the study and indicated the 
appropriate method for conducting the study. A combination of two qualitative research 
questions guided this study. These research questions addressed the perceptions of IT 
leaders concerning their lived experiences with cybersecurity: 
RQ1: How do public servants in IT leadership roles perceive the cybersecurity 
posture of government municipalities in Puerto Rico?  
RQ2: What factors do public servants in IT leadership roles perceive as most 
influential to achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture in government municipalities in 
Puerto Rico? 
The central question of the study was RQ1. This question was used to understand 
the readiness of government municipalities to protect and defend information resources. 
Although the primary research question could have resulted in a positive or negative 
understanding of the phenomenon, RQ2 focused on the elements influencing the 
understanding. This question was designed to provide a deeper understanding of the 
factors enabling or hindering public servants in protecting their information resources and 
data assets. Identifying and understanding influential factors are critical steps in 
developing strategies to stimulate conditions for improving cybersecurity and to mitigate 
those conditions preventing advances in its posture. 
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The central phenomenon of the study was the cybersecurity posture of the 
municipal government. The concept of cybersecurity relates to the capabilities required to 
safeguard information resources within cyberspace from cyber threats such as 
cyberattacks. Cyberattacks are intended to disrupt, disable, destroy, or control information 
resources, and to destroy data integrity or steal sensitive information (Kissel, 2013). The 
government’s dependency on information resources has made cybersecurity a relevant 
phenomenon to study, especially as it relates to the posture of government agencies. The 
concept of security posture refers to the status of security controls in place by 
organizations such as municipal governments to manage and react to cyber incidents 
(Kissel, 2013). Failing to adopt a resilient cybersecurity posture can be detrimental to 
government systems, municipal governance, local economy, and public safety. 
FOIA of 1966 safeguards most of the quantitative data related to cybersecurity 
from public disclosure. Cybersecurity data protected by FOIA of 1966 could include 
security assessments, audits, vulnerabilities, and security plans. Qualitative research 
provides the tools for understanding and “exploring the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem” (Creswell, 2013, Chapter 3: Summary, para. 1). 
Therefore, the insights of individuals can be used as reliable sources to study 
cybersecurity as a social problem. The research design for this study adhered to the 
characteristics of the qualitative research.  
The five qualitative research traditions include narrative, phenomenological, 
grounded theory, ethnographic, and case study (Creswell, 2013). Each tradition provides a 
different scholarly structure for organizing and presenting ideas (Creswell, 2013). In the 
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current study, phenomenology provided the framework to substantiate the collection and 
analysis of data grounded in participants’ experiences. The study centered on the 
experiences of public servants regarding cybersecurity in IT leadership roles at the 
municipal level. Using phenomenology as the research methodology enabled me to 
explore the research problem and capture the essence of the phenomenon. 
Previous researchers have taken advantage of phenomenology to explore 
phenomena related to cybersecurity. Moore (2014) used phenomenology to explore the 
development of information security policies to safeguard national security and deter 
cybercrime. Heuristic and transcendental are the two major research approaches within the 
tradition of phenomenology. These approaches provide slightly different philosophies and 
frameworks. In the current study, transcendental phenomenology provided a suitable 
approach to address the research questions in alignment with the purpose.  
Heuristic phenomenology requires researchers to “have personal experience and 
intense interest in the phenomenon” (Patton, 2002, Heuristic Inquiry, para. 2). In addition 
to the connection to the phenomenon, the heuristic approach emphasizes connecting with 
the participants. Moustakas (1994) explained that heuristic inquiry concentrates more on 
understanding the experience rather than the phenomenon. Heuristic phenomenology 
facilitates understanding of the phenomenon through “shared reflection and inquiry” 
(Patton, 2002, Heuristic Inquiry, para. 4). In traditional science, the characteristics of a 
heuristic approach can raise concerns regarding the objectivity of the researcher.  
Transcendental phenomenology shares the heuristic principle of connectedness. 
Transcendental phenomenology also follows a “disciplined and systematic” (Moustakas, 
73 
 
 
1994, p. 21) approach. This approach includes a process known as epoche or bracketing. 
According to Moustakas (1994), bracketing gives researchers the means to set aside 
“prejudgments, biases, and preconceived ideas about things” (p. 21). As a professional, I 
had experienced the phenomenon of inquiry while performing in diverse roles at different 
government levels for 17 years. These experiences may have contributed to 
prejudgments, biases, and preconceived ideas about cybersecurity, especially as it relates 
to the posture of governments. The bracketing process supported the objectivity while 
sustaining the use of intuition, which was fundamental for the study.  
Moustakas (1994) affirmed that reality is subject to the person perceiving it. 
Studying the perception of the reality of the cybersecurity posture of government 
municipalities depended on the lived experiences of the participants. This concept 
provided different insights into the phenomenon and the elements influencing it. In 
transcendental phenomenology, the process of converting empirical experience into 
essential insights is known as ideation (Moustakas, 1994). Through ideation, the 
consciousness of the participants is associated with the phenomenon creating meaning 
and extending the current body of knowledge. The previously discussed conditions 
supported the rationale of using transcendental phenomenology as the research design. 
Bracketing is further described in Chapter 4 as part of the evidence of trustworthiness. 
Role of the Researcher 
The researcher is the principal research tool for data collection in qualitative 
methods. Creswell (2013) explained that researchers could engage participants through 
different roles ranging from participatory to nonparticipatory. These roles include 
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complete participants, participants as observers, observers as participants, and complete 
observers. Depending on the role, researchers can take advantage of their sense of sight, 
hearing, touch, smell, and taste (Creswell, 2013). For this study, I adhered to the role of 
participant observer. 
Phenomenological inquiry involves interviews as a key data collection strategy 
(Creswell, 2013; Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2002). The current study included the use of 
face-to-face interviews requiring interaction with the participants. The participant observer 
role allowed me to interact with participants while using multiple senses to collect 
comprehensive data. In a face-to-face interview, the researcher can use sight to analyze the 
body language and facial expressions of the participants. Further, the researcher can use 
hearing to listen to the responses and notice distress or other emotion in the participant’s 
tone of voice. Depending on the situation, researchers have the flexibility to adjust the role 
or degree of participation (Creswell, 2013).  
Biases are “prejudice in favor of or against one thing” (New Oxford American 
Dictionary, n.d.). The background and experiences of a researcher can result in biases. 
The susceptibility of qualitative research to researcher bias acts as a limitation that can 
affect the objectivity of the study. In phenomenology, this limitation becomes stronger as 
researchers tend to be more connected to the research problem. The participants in this 
study were not related to me in any personal or professional way. The interaction with 
participants involved my role as a researcher with no power relationship over them. 
Transcendental phenomenology encompasses a bracketing process that helps the 
researcher manage possible bias. Other strategies to manage bias include the use of an 
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interview protocol and semistructured questions. The interview protocol and 
semistructured questions facilitated focusing on the research problem and prevent 
deviation toward possible biases. The participant observer role enabled the use of probing 
questions and other strategies to stimulate and engage the participant. This level of 
flexibility aided the collection of comprehensive data about the cybersecurity 
phenomenon that otherwise may have been lost. 
Methodology 
Participant Selection Logic 
The research design covers the population and “the unit of analysis to be studied” 
(Patton, 2002, Unit of Analysis, para. 3). The public sector constituted the finite 
population for this study. The lived experiences of public servants were the unit of 
analysis. The sample included public servants who had experienced the phenomenon 
while working in a municipal setting. IT leaders were defined as individuals performing 
senior-level IT functions.  
Creswell (2013) recommended studying multiple sites as well as individuals. The 
San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA is the most populated area in Puerto Rico (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2015a). The municipalities of San Juan, Bayamon, Carolina, Caguas, 
Guaynabo, Toa Baja, and Toa Alta have a population between 74,368 and 355,074 
inhabitants. Table 1 shows the seven municipalities with their corresponding populations.  
Criterion sampling takes into consideration cases meeting a “predetermined 
criterion of importance” (Patton, 2002, Criterion sampling, para. 1). For this study, the 
criteria included participants who were public servants; in IT leadership role; and had at 
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least 2 years of experience working within highly populated municipalities. The 
participants meeting these criteria had more experience with the phenomenon and were 
able to provide relevant data to the inquiry. A 2-step approach was followed to ensure 
that the participants met the criteria. The first step was working with municipalities listed 
in Table 1 to identify candidates who meet the criteria. A letter of cooperation was used 
with the municipalities to obtain their permission before reaching out to the candidates. 
The second step included corroborating the criteria with the participants. The criteria 
information of the participants was documented as part of the interview protocol.  
Table 1 
 
Populations of Research Sites 
Municipality Population 
San Juan 355,074 
Bayamon 189,159 
Carolina 161,884 
Caguas 134,481 
Guaynabo 90,879 
Toa Baja 82,065 
Toa Alta 74,368 
*Estimate from 2015 obtained from U.S. Census Bureau 
Patton (2002) stated that “there are no rules for sampling in qualitative inquiry.” 
Nevertheless, having an equal number of participants from each municipality may be a 
contributing factor to the credibility of the data. For consistency, the sample size was 
formed from an equal number consisting of two participants per site. A sample size of 10 
to 14 participants can facilitate the collection of in-depth and reliable information. 
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Therefore, a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 14 participants were considered an 
acceptable sample size.  
The process of identifying, contacting, and recruiting participants started after the 
approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB). The first step was reaching out by 
phone to the municipalities listed in Table 1 to obtain their collaboration in the 
identification, recruitment, and interview locations. Their agreement to collaborate were 
documented in a letter of cooperation. The telephone conversation followed a script 
reviewed by the IRB which includes a summary of the purpose of the study, the sampling 
criteria, and verification that the public servants met the criteria. If the potential 
participants met the criteria, an invitation to participate was issued. If the potential 
participant accepted, a consent form with a sample of the interview questions, the 
explanation of the conditions for audio recording, and the confidentiality of participant 
information was sent by email to make official their participation in the study.  
Creswell (2013) emphasized that the sample size is as important as the sampling 
strategy. Qualitative research provides a sense of balance between the breadth and depth 
of the investigation. This tradeoff provided the opportunity to concentrate on a smaller 
sample size to attempt to collect more data. In phenomenological studies, it is 
recommended to work with a sample size ranging from five to 25 participants (Creswell, 
2013). A sample size within this range is sufficient to reach saturation. The study started 
with a minimum of 10 participants as an acceptable sample size. Depending on the level 
of saturation, up to four more participants could be recruited and interviewed for a total 
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of 14. This strategy ensured a positive relationship between saturation and sample size 
while providing the flexibility to concentrate on information-rich cases. 
Instrumentation 
A phenomenological approach was used to concentrate on the lived experiences 
of the participants. Therefore, the data collection instrument was crucial to capturing the 
essence the experiences of the participants with the phenomenon. Qualitative data consist 
of observation, interviews, documents, and audiovisual materials (Creswell, 2013). Each 
type of data can be subject to a variety of data collection techniques. Observing IT 
leaders performing during a cyber incident in person or through audiovisuals may not be 
appropriate due to potential legal concerns about exposing sensitive information. A 
similar situation could emerge in the review of artifacts that could be valuable to the 
study. However, artifacts such as security assessments, vulnerabilities, and security plans 
are exempted from public release under the FOIA of 1966. However, the use of 
interviews is appropriate for the proposed qualitative research plan. 
Interviews served as the data collection instrument. Phenomenology “consists of 
in-depth and multiple interviews with participants” (Creswell, 2013, “Procedure for 
Conducting Phenomenological,” para. 5). The intent of using this approach was to gain 
an understanding of how IT leaders perceive the cybersecurity posture of municipalities 
in Puerto Rico. Creswell (2013) and Patton (2002) agreed on the use of in-depth 
interviews with individuals who have experienced the phenomenon. Therefore, the 
methodology for the study included in-depth face-to-face interviews. The interviews 
incorporated open-ended questions and follow a semistructured protocol. Using a 
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semistructured protocol helped to maintain the participants within scope, and not limit 
their responses. 
 The protocol included a total of 13 questions. The questions were aligned with 
the research problem, the conceptual framework, and the literature review. This 
alignment in combination with the reviews of the Dissertation Supervisory Committee 
and the University Research Reviewer (URR) supported the content validity of the 
instrument. The interview protocol generated sufficient and relevant data. The themes 
and codes discovered during the literature review were associated with the dimensions 
influencing digital government and the questions in the instrument were related to these 
concepts. Appendix B includes the interview protocol with the 13 questions that were 
used as part of the data collection instrument. In addition to these questions, the interview 
protocol required the collection of information such as the date, place of the meeting, and 
confirmation that the participant is meeting the criteria. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
The recruitment process consisted of contacting the selected municipalities to 
obtain their consent to recruit potential participants. Their collaboration in the recruitment 
process was part of a letter of cooperation established with each of the municipalities. 
Potential participants were contacted by phone to validate that they meet the criteria to 
participate in the study. If a potential participant expresses interest in the study or needs 
additional information before deciding to participate, a consent form was made available 
to complete the recruitment process. The purpose of the form was to provide a 
description of the research, details about the data collection, and to ensure voluntary 
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participation and confidentiality. The process continued until completing the recruitment 
of two participants per municipality for a minimum of 10. This sample size was aligned 
with Creswell’s (2013) recommendation of using between five to 25 participants to 
achieve a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. 
The data collection was performed via face-to-face interviews with the 
participants using an interview protocol. The interview was audio recorded. Patton (2002) 
explained that recorders do not remove the need for taking notes. Instead, recorders offer 
an opportunity to concentrate on taking strategic notes. For this reason, the plan included 
using a combination of field notes, mind maps, and audio recording. I was responsible for 
conducting the interview, taking notes, and setting up the recording. The combination of 
data types helped to prevent data overload by providing the means to go back to the 
audio, transcripts, or field notes to evaluate data that could have been overlooked during 
the collection process. The data collection event occurred once with each participant. The 
duration of the interviews was around 50 minutes.  
If recruitment results in less than 10 participants or limited information for the 
study, the process could be repeated. If necessary, other municipalities within the San 
Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA with a population higher than 70,000 such as Toa Baja 
and Toa Alta, could have been contacted. The participants entered and exited the 
interview after a debriefing that was part of the interview protocol. Follow-up procedures 
occurred by phone and e-mail to support the member checking strategy. Figure 4 shows 
all the highly populated municipalities that could have been targeted during the study.  
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Figure 4. San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA and highly populated municipalities. Adapted from 
“San Juan-Carolina, PR Combined Statistical Area” by U.S. Census Bureau, 2012. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Organizing and coding the data from the field notes, mind maps, and audio 
recording were the initial steps in the data analysis process. These data types share an 
overlapping connection to the research questions. However, the mind mapping is related 
to RQ2. Mind mapping served as a “modeling technique which intends to portray ideas, 
beliefs, values, and attitudes and their relationship” (Burgess-Allen & Owen-Smith, 2010, 
p. 407). This technique facilitated the identification of the most influential factors for 
achieving a resilient cybersecurity posture and their relationship.  
The field notes were planned to be captured using a computer and a word 
processor. The audio was recorded using a digital recorder. Later, the recordings were 
converted into transcripts. NVivo is a qualitative data analysis software used to support 
data coding, analysis, interpretation, and representation (QSR International, n.d.). After 
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organizing the data into a computer using files and folders, the data were uploaded into 
NVivo. The mind mapping was also transferred into NVivo. Horizontalization was the 
first step in the coding strategy. This process involved listing all the relevant experiences 
about cybersecurity expressed during the interviews. These experiences underwent a 
process of reduction, including grouping the horizons into “meaning units” (Creswell, 
2013, “Phenomenological Analysis,” para. 1). The initial meaning units started as codes 
that later were group into themes. The coding strategy utilized a combination of 
predetermined and emerging codes.  
Creswell (2013) recommends starting the coding process with no more than six 
categories and then expand as necessary. The initial codes included elements such as 
policies, processes, collaboration, budget, and technology. NVivo’s pattern-based 
automatic coding was attempted to facilitate the process. Then, codes were grouped into 
themes describing ideas related to the experiences of the IT leaders and the essence of the 
cybersecurity posture. These strategies contributed to describing the cybersecurity 
posture of the municipalities and in identifying those variables that according to the 
participants have the most significant influence on the phenomenon. 
Clustering and thematizing were imperative for the interpretation and 
representation of the research data. Themes are defined as “broad units of information” 
(Creswell, 2013, “Describing, Classifying, and Interpreting,” para. 6). These units are 
encompassed by invariant codes that when combined form an idea related to the theme. 
Creswell (2013) affirmed that selecting between five to seven themes is a common 
practice for data analysis. Emerging topics were discovered during the data analysis. 
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Burgess-Allen and Owen-Smith (2010) described mind maps as illustrations representing 
“concepts, ideas or tasks linked to and arranged radially around a central key word or 
idea” (p. 407). The primary branches departed from predetermined themes originating 
from the dimensions influencing digital government framework. The major ideas 
included concepts such as general, institutional, collaboration, organizational, data, and 
technology. The relevant experiences that cannot be clustered or labeled under the 
predetermined themes lead to the development of new themes.  
After coding the data, a deeper analysis and interpretation was performed. The 
effectiveness of the data analysis techniques varies with the type of research approach. 
Creswell (2013) proposed a simplified variation of Moustakas’ as the preferred data 
analysis technique to analyze data for a phenomenological study. First, the researcher’s 
personal experience with the phenomenon was described through the process of 
bracketing. This process allows researchers to set aside personal experience and 
concentrate on the participants (Creswell, 2013).  
Individual textural descriptions for each participant were developed as part of the 
process. These descriptions explained the state of affairs experienced by the participants 
(Creswell, 2013). Based on the textural descriptions, individual structural descriptions 
explaining how the experience occurred could be developed (Creswell, 2013). The 
analysis incorporated the textural descriptions into comprehensive passage known as a 
composite description. Creswell (2013) refers to this passage as the essence of the 
phenomenological experienced. Phenomenology studies “the common meaning for several 
individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or a phenomenon” (Creswell, 2013, 
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Definition and Background, para. 1). The composite description represented the 
experiences of the participants as a whole. 
Discrepant cases were treated following the data analysis plan. During the 
horizontalization, all statements were given equal value. Then the cases were tested for 
reduction or elimination. This test included analyzing the relevance to understanding the 
phenomenon and fitting statements within the predetermined labels. If discrepant cases 
are relevant, but not aligned with codes and themes, new labels emerged as part of the 
clustering and thematizing process. Discrepant cases could provide a valuable alternate 
insight into the cybersecurity posture of government municipalities. 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
Reviewing the data with the participants is essential for supporting credibility 
(Creswell, 2013). Member checking consists of sharing the “analysis, interpretations, and 
conclusion” (Creswell, 2013, Validation Strategies, para. 7) with the participants of the 
study. This strategy provided an opportunity to reach back to the participants for 
feedback on the researcher’s interpretation versus the essence of their original statements. 
This strategy allowed the participants to provide an accurate judgment of the research 
data. The data were shared with the participants by email and was limited to the results.  
External validity also plays a major role in the trustworthiness of the research. 
External audits can help to support the validity of the research. The Dissertation 
Supervisory Committee served as external auditors. The Committee included a content 
expert, methodology experts, and the URR. The content and methodology experts 
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provided guidance and support to ensure the quality and relevance of the research. These 
committee's members were engaged throughout all the phases of the research process. 
Similarly, the URR provided an additional layer of review which served as a quality 
assurance mechanism for the research. The committee's guidance and support were 
crucial to the quality and credibility of the study. 
Transferability 
Cybersecurity is a new phenomenon, in particular as it relates to the posture of the 
local government. Providing enough information to support the possible transferability of 
the study and the findings to other settings was crucial to help reduce the knowledge gap 
about this phenomenon. The literature review was presented in Chapter 2 with references 
to all the artifacts reviewed during the process. Chapter 3 provided a thick description of 
the methodology that could facilitate replicating the study in another setting. Any 
deviations to the design were discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, Chapter 4 included 
detailed descriptions of the settings, codes, themes, and other characteristics as a means 
for readers to determine the transferability of the findings to other settings. 
Dependability 
The dependability of the research was supported using audit trails, including 
artifacts documenting the identification of the problem, prospectus, literature review, 
research design, data collection instrument and evidence of the collection, data analysis, 
and interpretation of the findings. The identification of the research problem as well as 
preliminary frameworks, designs, methodologies, and implications were captured in a 
historical alignment tool. A prospectus outlining the problem, purpose, research 
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questions, and a high-level view of the proposed research design, framework and 
methodology were approved before starting the research.  
The approved data collection instrument is available as in Appendix B. The data 
collection was evidenced by the interview schedule, field notes, and audio recording. 
These data types were used to support audit trails among the collected data. For instance, 
the audio recordings were converted into transcription to be compared with the field 
notes and mind maps. This strategy supported dependability by allowing me to cross 
reference the different data sources. Lastly, the interpretation of the findings was 
documented in composite descriptions that were validated through member checking. 
Confirmability 
According to Patton (2002), confirmability is essential to reducing bias, 
improving accuracy, and supporting impartiality of the research. The National Research 
Council (2009) states that the values that apply to research are the same values that relate 
to life. These values include “honesty, fairness, objectivity, openness, trustworthiness, 
and respect for others” (National Research Council, 2009, p. 3). Researcher bias can 
interfere with these values and the objectivity of the research which could lead to 
misleading results. O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner (2008) cautioned that researchers 
could influence qualitative research. The research design included bracketing as a form of 
reflexivity to support confirmability which was covered in Chapter 4.  
Like dependability, confirmability is achieved through an auditing process 
(Creswell, 2013). Patton (2002) explained that auditing of the research process supports 
dependability. On the other hand, auditing the results supports confirmability. This 
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auditing process fell over “the doctoral committee for graduate students and peer 
reviewers for scholarly journals” (Patton, 2002, Expert Audit Review, para. 1). The 
Dissertation Supervisory Committee and the URR served as the auditors for the overall 
trustworthiness of the research. These strategies provided confirmability by clarifying 
research bias, suspending prejudgments, and maintaining objectivity. 
Ethical Procedures 
Identifying and addressing ethical concerns and risks are crucial in scholarly 
research, including human participants. Walden University (2015) offers a Research 
Ethics Planning Worksheet to assist in the identification and management of ethical 
concerns. This worksheet was used as the preliminary tool to identify and address ethical 
concerns throughout the proposed research process. After the research proposal was 
approved, the Application for Research Ethics Review was submitted to the IRB.  
The IRB ensured that the research agrees with University’s ethical standards, as 
well as with pertinent laws and regulations to protect living persons from unethical 
practices and unnecessary risk as part of a research process (Walden University, 2018). 
The form included questions related to ethics, integrity, and confidentiality. The form 
required detailed procedures for recruitment and data collection, as well as for conducting 
a risk assessment. The form also covered conflict of interest, among other ethical matters. 
The supporting documentation approved by the IRB included the interview questions 
(See Appendix B), confidentiality agreement, and consent form. The IRB approval 
number was 11-07-17-0421741. 
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Treatment of human participants. The IRB application included a consent form 
as the artifact to gain access to the participants. After the approval of the IRB, this form 
was used to conclude the recruitment process by documenting the agreement of the 
participant to take part in the study. The consent form was distributed with enough time 
for participant review. This form included a description of the research, the data 
collection process, possible risk, and benefits. Further, the consent form explained that 
participation in the study is voluntary, and all information provided is kept confidential.  
The treatment of human participants was performed with dignity and respect. The 
recruitment of participants was fair. As described in the sampling strategy, the subjects 
met the defined criteria. Studying the cybersecurity posture of local government as a 
social problem offered social value and scientific validity. The outcome of the research 
led to strategies that could help secure and improve government services while reducing 
cost and cyber threats against sensitive data and the availability of government systems. 
These benefits outweighed the risks and made of the study, worth participating.  
Upon review, no ethical concerns were identified. The research design, data 
collection strategy, and data analysis plan were in line with the recommendations of 
Research Ethics Planning Worksheet. The recruitment method excluded special 
populations and vulnerable groups. An invitation to participate was sent to potential 
participants. If the participants were interested and met the criteria, the participants 
completed the consent form that was provided to take part in the study. Data were not 
collected without participant consent. Participants who refuse to participate could have 
been withdrawn from the study with no repercussion.  
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Before the interview, I reviewed the interview process, timeframe, and recording 
procedures to confirm the participants’ understanding of the process and conditions. The 
interview commenced after making sure that the participants do not have questions and 
are in agreements with the terms of the interview. The member checking strategy 
supported quality by obtaining the reaffirmation of the participants. The interviews did 
not contain system-specific or vulnerability-specific questions to avoid endangering the 
participant’s organization. These safeguards mitigated ethical concerns and ensured that 
the beneficence of this research outweighs the risks. 
Treatment of data. Privacy and confidentiality are two important ethical 
concerns. I signed the confidentiality agreement assenting the responsibilities to 
safeguard the confidentiality of the participants and the data. Losing data can be 
detrimental to researchers and participants. If the information is lost, researchers may 
have to repeat the collection process. On the other hand, sensitive information can put the 
participants at risk. Creswell (2013) recommends masking the name of the participants to 
ensure confidentiality. The study did not collect sensitive information. Nevertheless, the 
data of the participants were stored using pseudonyms.  
The research data were protected to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) cautioned that researchers who do not 
take advantage of available technology would be disadvantaged in contrast with those 
who avail of available technology. Unfortunately, technology is subject to system failures 
and theft. Creswell (2013) recommends creating backups of the research data. Backups 
and cloud storage solutions are excellent strategies to ensure availability against data loss. 
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Google Drive was used as a cloud storage solution to help prevent data loss and allow 
access from anywhere in the world. 
The data were stored on a personal computer and replicated into Google Drive. 
The computer was password protected, and the data were stored on an encrypted hard 
drive. The data replicated to Google Drive is secured using 2-step verification. This 
process requires a combination of username, password, and verification code (Google, 
n.d.). The verification code can only be received or generated by my phone. If the 
username and password are compromised, the attacker cannot access the information due 
to the missing verification code.  
Raw data were not disseminated to any third party. Only the participants and I 
could access to raw data. During the member checking process, the results were shared 
with the respective participants for validation and feedback. The Dissertation Supervisory 
Committee could have access to the data to ensure the trustworthiness of the data 
collection, analysis, and interpretation after signing a confidentiality agreement. The final 
dissertation will be published in ProQuest upon receiving the approval of the University. 
I will attempt to disseminate the final research by publishing the investigation in 
scholarly journals. Since the research will not include sensitive information, the data will 
be kept for at least five years. 
Summary 
The research design provided the means to explore and understand the 
cybersecurity posture of municipalities in Puerto Rico. The design was based on the 
principles of phenomenology as a research tradition with a transcendental approach. 
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Transcendental phenomenology provided the scholarly structure for exploring, collecting, 
organizing, analyzing, and presenting information about cybersecurity postures during 
the research process. This phenomenological approach took advantage of researchers as 
the primary data collection tool.  
I performed as a participant observer and did not have any relationship with the 
participants. The population consisted of public servants, while the sample consisted of 
public servants acting in IT leadership roles in municipal government within Puerto Rico. 
The study concentrated in highly populated municipalities within the San Juan – Carolina 
– Caguas MSA. It is expected that these municipalities had a more complex infrastructure 
and a higher dependency on IT systems. Part of the criterion was for the participants to 
have at least 2 years of experience with the phenomenon to guarantee an adequate level 
of experience and offer relevant data. Phenomenological studies could include up to 25 
participants (Creswell, 2013). However, the larger the sample size, the shorter the depth 
of the research. The study consisted of a sample size of 10 participants to concentrate on 
gaining a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. 
According to Creswell (2013), phenomenological studies rely mainly on interview 
data. Analyzing interviews from different participants could lead to the finding of shared 
or similar experiences that may be significant to address the research problem. This study 
used a researcher-developed data collection instrument consisting of in-depth face-to-face 
interviews following a semistructured protocol. This approach enabled participants to 
describe the essence of their experiences with cyber threats.  
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The data analysis plan leveraged the use of technological resources including 
NVivo, Google Drive, as well as other general software. NVivo served as the qualitative 
data analysis software for the organization, analysis, interpretation, and visualization of 
the data. Google Drive was used as the secure cloud solution for storing all the research 
data. The coding and them strategies consisted of a combination of predetermined and 
emerging elements. Predetermined codes emerged from the literature and the conceptual 
framework of the study. Emerging elements arose during the data analysis process.  
The trustworthiness of the study was supported by validation strategies such as 
clarifying research bias, member checking, and external audits. Researcher biases were 
managed through bracketing. This process allowed me to provide an insight of my 
experiences with the phenomenon to support objectivity and the use of intuition which is 
fundamental to transcendental phenomenology. Member checking was used to share the 
results of the findings with each of the participants. Also, the Dissertation Supervisory 
Committee composed of a content expert, methodology experts, and URR served as the 
external auditor to the process and related process. 
The ethical procedures included using a Research Ethics Planning Worksheet to 
identify and address possible ethical concerns. Further, an Application for Research 
Ethics Review was submitted to the IRB to ensured that the research met ethic 
requirements and aligned with the University’s ethical standards and applicable ethical 
regulations. Participation in the study was voluntary and confidential. Participants were 
required to complete consent forms to participate in the research. Further, the research 
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data were safeguarded through the implementation of administrative, operational, and 
technical controls to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
The next chapter included an overview of the outcome of the study. During 
Chapter 4, research elements such as the setting, data collection and analysis, evidence of 
trustworthiness, and results were described. Chapter 4 provided a thick description of the 
performed research methodology and its alignment to the research design described 
during this chapter. These descriptions supported the transferability of the findings by 
providing enough information for readers to determine if the results could be transferable 
to their knowledge settings. Also, deviations to the proposed methodology were 
explained and justified as part of the upcoming chapter. 
  
94 
 
 
Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this study was to understand the cybersecurity posture of 
municipal governments from the perception of public servants serving in IT leadership 
roles in Puerto Rico. The principal factors affecting the cybersecurity posture of 
municipal governments were also addressed as part of the study. A phenomenological 
approach was used to address the knowledge gap about this problem. This approach 
focused on the lived experiences of IT leaders as information-rich cases.  
Two qualitative research questions guided the study. These research questions 
addressed the perceptions of IT leaders’ regarding the phenomenon of inquiry. The first 
research question addressed how public servants in IT leadership roles perceived the 
cybersecurity posture of local government municipalities in Puerto Rico. The second 
question addressed the factors that public servants in IT leadership roles perceived to be 
most influential in achieving a resilient cybersecurity posture. 
The research methodology did not include a pilot study. Also, demographic data 
were not collected to safeguard the confidentiality of the participants. The sections of this 
chapter include the results of the study related to the purpose and research questions. This 
chapter also covers other related research elements such as the setting, data collection, 
data analysis, and trustworthiness of the data. This chapter offers a thick description of 
these research elements. Further, deviations from the original methodology are explained 
and justified. 
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Research Setting 
The research setting encompassed highly populated municipalities within the San 
Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA. This organizational condition of highly populated 
municipalities required managing budgets, services, and information resources in 
alignment with the size of the population. These conditions had a positive influence on 
the participants to support their development as information-rich cases. Other conditions 
that could have influenced the experiences of the participants with cybersecurity 
participants were political changes, fiscal situation, and natural disasters.  
After the 2016 election in Puerto Rico, the political leadership administering the 
targeted municipalities remained unchanged. However, in June of 2017, the mayor of 
Guaynabo resigned from his position (Suarez-Torres, 2017). After a new election, a new 
mayor from the same political party was elected having minimum impact on the 
participants. This condition provided continuity of operation for the participants 
performing in IT leadership roles within the municipalities. 
The fiscal crisis also affected the participants and their organizations. Since 
January 2017, the oversight board established by the Puerto Rico Oversight, 
Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) of 2016 was responsible for 
approving fiscal plans and budgets as well as requesting their revision and enforcing 
requirements upon them. The government budget had been reduced, directly affecting the 
targeted municipalities and their IT operations.  
Another significant factor affecting the participants and their experiences was the 
aftermath of hurricane Maria. In September 2017, a Category 5 hurricane devastated 
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Puerto Rico leaving its critical infrastructures such as the telecommunications, power 
grid, and water and wastewater systems inoperable. Most of the municipalities that 
participated in this study spent an average of 3 months without electricity. This situation 
increased the participants’ experience in disaster recovery efforts supporting the 
availability of their systems. The situation also limited the availability of the participants 
in these municipalities. Participants in the municipalities of Toa Baja and Toa Alta were 
planned to be part of the study, but they could not be reached due to the lack of electrical 
power and problems with telecommunications after hurricane Maria.  
Data Collection 
The data collection process started on May 7 and lasted until May 18 of 2018. 
During the recruitment process, 10 public servants working in an IT leadership role in a 
municipal setting in Puerto Rico were invited to participate in the study. A total of 10 
public servants agreed to participate in the study. The municipalities that took part in the 
data collection were San Juan, Bayamon, Carolina, Caguas, and Guaynabo. A 
combination of field notes and audio recordings was used to collect the data. The data 
collection process was performed during face-to-face interviews with the participants.  
The interviews took place at the participants’ place of work. Seven of the 
participants were interviewed in private offices. Three participants were interviewed in 
conference rooms. Both the offices and the conference rooms offered security and 
privacy to the participants. The frequency of the interviews was limited to one session. 
The duration of the sessions lasted an average of 1 hour. Before the interviews, 10-minute 
briefings were performed to describe the study and the conditions. After the initial 
97 
 
 
briefing, the session advanced to the interviews, which lasted an average of 45 minutes. 
Each interview was followed by a 10-minute debrief to answer any questions from the 
participant and to explain the next steps in the process.  
During the interviews, I wrote field notes in a notepad. With the consent of the 
participants, the interviews were recorded. The primary method for the audio recording 
was a smartphone application named Audio Recorder, which was developed by Sony 
under the Android Open Source Project. A second recording device was used as a backup 
to the smartphone application. The secondary device was a Yemenren 8GB Sound Audio 
Recorder Dictaphone.  
Three minor deviations transpired from the data collection plan presented in 
Chapter 3. The first deviation was capturing the field notes in a notepad instead of in a 
digital format using a computer. The notepad was less distracting and helped to foster a 
better interpersonal connection with the participant. The second deviation was drafting 
mind maps during the interviews. Mind maps were not used during data collection 
because the process reduced emphasis on from the interview. Instead, the emphasis was 
placed on the field notes, which were crucial to developing probing questions using the 
participant’s examples. The third deviation was two of the eight interviews were not one-
on-one. Due to lack of time and conflicting priorities, one interview was scheduled with 
two participants at the same time. The person in the primary leadership role served as the 
primary participant and the second person performed a supporting role to provide 
additional information. 
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Data Analysis 
After collecting the data, I used a text-based toolkit product named Trint to 
transcribe the audio recording. I reviewed the transcripts for quality and mechanics. 
Then, I translated the transcripts from Spanish to English and entered into NVivo. Two 
deviations from the original data analysis plan occurred. The first deviation was not using 
NVivo’s pattern-based automatic coding because this capability was in an experimental 
stage and could have affected the trustworthiness of the study. The second deviation was 
the use of structural description. This description requires deep insight from the 
participants that could lead to their identification, and the study was designed to keep the 
identity of the participants confidential. Beyond these deviations, the data analysis was 
performed according to the plan. The data analysis followed a phenomenological 
approach consisting of horizontalization, reduction and elimination, clustering and 
thematizing, validation, and individual and composite textural descriptions. Each phase 
was recorded in NVivo as shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Data analysis phases documented in NVivo. This figure illustrates the 
phenomenological data analysis phases as documented in NVivo qualitative data analysis 
software. 
During the horizontalization phase, all of the relevant experiences about 
cybersecurity expressed during the interview were identified. The experiences were given 
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equal importance. I noticed a connection between the participants’ experience and the 
security controls listed by NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and Organizations, particularly regarding the controls required for 
low impact systems. A total of 106 items emerged as part of the initial coding process. 
The second phase consisted of reduction and elimination. The 106 codes were 
reviewed to validate that the experience was necessary for the understanding of the 
phenomena. During the reduction process, the initial codes were grouped into meaning 
units (see Creswell, 2013). The second step was the process of elimination. During this 
process, the codes were reviewed taking into consideration possible overlaps, repetition, 
and vagueness. Through the processes of reduction and elimination, the codes were 
reduced to 58 codes, almost half of the initial coding.  
The next phase of the data analysis was clustering and thematization. During this 
phase, meaning units were clustered into broad units of information or themes (see 
Creswell, 2013). As explained in Chapter 3, the codes included a combination of 
predetermined and emerging codes describing ideas related to the experiences of the IT 
leaders and the essence of the cybersecurity posture. The codes were analyzed to align 
with Creswell’s (2013) recommendation of five to seven themes. The first six themes 
were aligned with RQ2 and the dimensions of the conceptual framework. These codes 
included general, institutional, collaboration, organizational, data, and technology 
dimensions. The seventh code emerged later in the process and was aligned with RQ1 
and was labeled as posture. Another theme was created to capture administrative data 
such as memorable quotes. All of the emerging themes were within the scope of the 
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conceptual framework’s dimensions and were clustered as subthemes under the 
applicable domain. With the additions, the codes increased from 58 to 66.  
The fourth phase was validating the codes and themes. I followed three steps 
recommended by Moustakas (1994):  
• Are codes and themes expressed explicitly in the complete transcription? 
• Are codes and themes compatible if not explicitly expressed? 
• Delete not explicit or compatible codes and themes. 
Based on the guidance from Moustakas (1994), I removed not explicit codes and 
themes. The codes that were identified as not compatible but valid to the study were 
moved to compatible nodes. Those identified as not compatible with the study were 
deleted. During the validation phase, the themes were aligned with the cybersecurity-
related areas listed in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 200, Minimum 
Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems, rather than 
individual security controls. Table 2 shows an overview of FIPS 200 cybersecurity-
related areas referenced by the participants as information-rich cases. After the validation 
phase, the total nodes were narrowed to 46. 
The next step in the process was the development of individual textural 
descriptions. Using NVivo, I aligned the initial data file containing the interview 
transcripts with the coding of meaning and broad units of information as the foundation 
for the textural descriptions. These textural descriptions were incorporated into 
comprehensive passages known as a composite description representing the experience of 
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the participants as a whole. The composite description was used as the content for the 
study results. My interpretation of the composite description is presented in Chapter 5.  
Table 2 
Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements Areas Referenced by Participants 
Cybersecurity-Related Areas Referenced Cybersecurity-Related Areas Referenced  
Access Control Yes Media Protection No 
Awareness and Training 
 
Yes Physical and Environmental 
Protection 
Yes 
Audit and Accountability No Planning  No 
Certification, Accreditation, 
and Security Assessments 
No Personnel Security No 
Configuration Management Yes Risk Assessment  Yes 
Contingency Planning 
 
Yes System and Services 
Acquisition 
Yes 
Identification and 
Authentication 
 
No System and Communications 
Protection 
Yes 
Incident Response 
 
Yes System and Information 
Integrity 
Yes 
Maintenance No  
Note. Cybersecurity-related areas were adapted from the Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information 
Systems. 
Discrepant cases were managed as part of reduction and elimination, clustering 
and thematizing, and validation. The cases were tested during the reduction and 
elimination to validate relevance and labeling. The discrepant cases that were relevant but 
not aligned to existing codes emerged as new labels. A similar approach was followed 
during the clustering and thematizing phases. During the validation phase, all of the 
nodes were validated following Moustakas’s (1994) validation strategy.  
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Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
The documents used to support the research were peered reviewed or originated 
from reliable sources such as government agencies. The participants were public servants 
in IT leadership roles who had experienced the phenomenon. A member checking 
technique was used to support credibility and validate the analysis, interpretations, and 
conclusions. A summary of the results with the key themes was emailed to the 
participants. The intent was for the participants to provide reassurance of the results and 
identify possible gaps or misconceptions. The participants did not report discrepancies 
with the results. The deviations to the strategies presented in Chapter 3 were explained 
and justified as part of the Data Collection and Data Analysis sections. 
Transferability 
The literature review was presented in Chapter 2 with references to all of the 
artifacts reviewed during the process. Chapter 3 provided a thick description of the 
methodology to facilitate the replication the study in another setting. This chapter 
provided a thick description of the settings, codes, themes, and other characteristics as a 
means for readers to determine the transferability of the findings to other settings. The 
deviations were discussed in the Data Collection and Data Analysis sections and should 
have no significant impact on the transferability of the study.  
Dependability 
The dependability of the research is supported through audit trails, including 
artifacts documenting the identification of the problem, prospectus, literature review, 
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research design, data collection instrument and evidence of the collection, data analysis, 
and interpretation of the findings. The identification of the research problem as well as 
preliminary frameworks, designs, and methodologies were captured in a historical 
alignment tool. A prospectus outlining the problem, purpose, research questions, and an 
overview of the research design, framework and methodology were approved before 
starting the research. The approved data collection instrument is in Appendix B. The data 
collection audit trail includes audio files, transcript, and translated transcript that are 
stored as data files in an NVivo project. This strategy supports dependability by allowing 
cross-referencing the different data sources used in the research.  
Confirmability 
The research design included bracketing as a form of reflexivity to avoid biases. 
In addition to bracketing, Creswell (2013) mentioned that auditing could be used to 
support confirmability. Similar to the approached described in the Dependability section, 
each phase of the data analysis is documented in individual folders inside the Codes 
sections of the NVivo project, including a folder for retired and combined nodes as 
documented in Figure 5. The folders are linked to memos with insight on the process. 
The individual and composite textural descriptions are documented in memos within 
NVivo. Also, the mind map and visual representation of the results were developed using 
NVivo. The Dissertation Supervisory Committee and the URR served as the auditors for 
the overall trustworthiness of the research. These strategies provided confirmability by 
clarifying research bias, suspending prejudgments, and maintaining objectivity. 
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Bracketing  
I have 17 years of experience with cybersecurity at the federal government level 
while performing in different roles ranging from a system administrator to the 
information system security manager. Between 2014 and 2016, I was responsible for the 
cybersecurity of a national system that interconnected with 46 state-level systems. During 
this time, I was exposed to the posture of various states and local governments. Their 
posture was not mature which led to several collaboration initiatives to raise awareness 
and help improve their posture. The initiates included webinar and conferences as well as 
establishing minimum security controls, assessment of the controls, as well as developing 
federal regulation to mandate the use of information security agreements. These 
experiences could have contributed to biases against the posture of the local government. 
The Data Collection, Data Analysis, and Evidence of Trustworthiness sections on this 
chapter included some of the mechanisms used to counteract possible biases. Outside the 
research design, my personal experience during the research was contrary to any bias as it 
driven by curiosity and interest in participants' perception of the phenomenon. 
Study Results 
 The results were organized in the predetermined and emerging codes discovered 
during the data analyses process. The results include quotes from transcripts and data 
visualization such as mind maps and hierarchy charts developed in NVivo to illustrate the 
results. The results start with a section titled Posture which answered RQ1. The 
remaining sections are associated with RQ2. Figure 6 shows a summary of the primary 
elements affecting the local government’s cybersecurity posture discovered in the study.  
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Figure 6. Mind map of dimensions and elements influencing digital government. This figure 
illustrates the dimensions that were part of the contextual framework of the research methodology 
in alignment with the elements identified as part of the results of the study as influential factors to 
the local government cybersecurity posture. 
Posture 
The participants perceived the posture of their municipality as resilient. P-3 
stated, “on a scale of 1 to 5; I would say that we are a 4.” Meanwhile, P-4 used the results 
from the comptroller’s IT audit as a resiliency measurement where the municipalities 
with a low score “should not be very protected and that possibly they do not have the 
tools or processes to work with cybersecurity.” The participants agreed that their 
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municipalities are more secure because of their ability to implement mature processes. 
Figure 7 shows the Organizational Structure and Processes as the most relevant 
dimension supporting the posture of the municipal government.  
Outside their municipalities, the participants talked about the posture of federal 
and state government as an influential factor to their own. These postures were captured 
as part of the Institutional Framework as identified in Figure 7. However, most of the 
data were about how this dimension is failing to provide the conditions to support 
cybersecurity. P-3 described the federal government as stringent while the state was 
seemed as flexible with cybersecurity. P-8 revealed using stricter processes to protect 
health data due to federal requirements. P-3 said that insularism prevents the state from 
seeing “what happens in the world of cyberattacks and we are alienated from our political 
relationship with the United States where things that affect them will eventually affect 
us.” P-6 said that most incidents happened at the state and summarized the overall 
posture as “some agencies give more love to cybersecurity than others.” 
The participants identified the information and technology dimensions as critical 
supporting elements. P-2 expressed feeling “safe with the technologies that we have in 
place.” P-3 pointed to technology as the reason they can provide the same services as 
other municipalities, but with more accessibility, efficiency, and security while 
recognizing that technology alone does not make them invulnerable. P-7 considered 
technologies and processes among other elements, to be of equal value stating, “I 
understand that all the factors are equally important because if you implement one thing 
without implementing the other, you will not reach a resilient posture.” P-1 mentioned, 
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“there is always room for improvement” and is confident that “little by little” the posture 
can be improved. The rest of the participants also acknowledged having areas to improve. 
 
Figure 7. Hierarchy chart of dimensions and elements supporting cybersecurity. This figure 
provides a hierarchical view of the dimension and element, and their influence on the local 
government cybersecurity posture. The bigger the area, the more relevant to the posture.  
General Context 
The general context dimension encompassed the external factors affecting the 
cybersecurity posture of the municipalities. These factors were identified by the 
participants as changes in technology, economic situation, political agendas, and the 
interest of the private sector.  
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Technological change. As seen in Figure 7, the participants identified 
technological change as the general context element with the most significant impact on 
their posture as it encompasses multiple threats and challenges. P-3 explained that IT 
services have evolved from one office with a system and dedicated administrator into 
multiple systems, networks, and teams devoted to supporting a vast range of IT services. 
P-1 explained:  
The Internet has been around for many years, but the access to it has increased, 
and with higher bandwidth and increased in services there is more exposure. That 
transition led the municipality to provide online services, but there is no education 
about the risks. 
P-1, P-3, P-4, P-5, and P-7 agreed that cybersecurity is an ever-changing domain. 
P-5 stated, “policies change, security changes, viruses, and attacks change.” P-4 
recognized that business processes are mobility and data-driven and recommended 
adopting cloud technologies to address some of the challenges. However, P-7 warned 
about the risks and exposure of cloud service providers to frequent attacks and explained 
that attackers prefer targets that will give them more data and reputation versus a 
municipality.  
P-5 explained that instead of technical knowledge attackers are relying on scripts, 
tools, and the Internet to execute attacks. P-1 stated, “organizations believe that they will 
not be victims of cyberattacks because their data are not of interest.” P-5 warned about 
attacks designed to lure users through phishing emails, website spoofing, and rogue 
109 
 
 
wireless hotspots. P-1 affirmed that attacks like ransomware “encrypt social security and 
credit card information in the same way that will encrypt nonconfidential information.”  
P-7 stated, “you block one thing, and half an hour later you are being attacked by 
other means because hackers are always looking for ways to do damage.” P-6 said, “I can 
buy a great appliance, but there is already a hacker trying to compromise the system.” P-8 
agreed and stated, “if you stay behind it will be much easier for someone to attack you.” 
P-4 stated, “a lot of people out there trying to enter and get information. Therefore, what 
worries me the most is not knowing what is happening?” P-4 cited Murphy's Law and 
advised being vigilant even when nothing seems to be happening.  
Economy. P-1, P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6, and P-7 highlighted the fiscal situation as an 
element affecting the availability of resources. P-6 stated:  
The municipalities of Puerto Rico economically are not well. Before the 
hurricane, I went to another municipality where for economic reasons employees 
only worked half-days. If they do not have a budget and their employees work 
half-days, they will not have money to purchase cybersecurity equipment. 
P-3 identified PROMESA as one of the factors affecting the government’s budget. 
The situation has also affected the staff as P-6 said, “some employees are very committed 
and others who are disgruntled because they have not had salary increases, bonuses were 
eliminated, and sick days were reduced.” P-3 believes that the government should not 
“use money as an excuse to do not do the things that must be done. We must do things 
well, ethically, morally, and legally regardless of whether there is money or not.”  
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Politics. P-3 mentioned that diverse political ideologies could turn into fanaticism 
affecting operations and services. P-7 considered that having 78 municipalities nourish 
division and repetition. Several participants agreed and endorsed consolidation strategies. 
Each municipality has a data center to what P-6 asked: “Why do we need so many data 
centers providing the same services?” P-6 uses the private sector as an example of data 
center consolidation to reduce cost and identified politics as the main obstacle. However, 
P-6 stated, “If I try to consolidate using my data center, the municipalities of the opposite 
political party will not agree.” P-5 mentioned that politics has also affected 
interoperability and explained that during hurricane Maria, the government was using 
different frequencies instead of a standard emergency channel.  
Private sector interest. P-5 mentioned that private sector interest leads to 
recommending products that are not the best for the municipality with the intention of 
making a profit or taking out the competitor. According to P-5, these interests expand to 
the telecommunication services where private entities after buying other companies had 
broken preestablished agreements preventing the reuse of relay towers by other providers 
resulting in a degraded infrastructure. P-5 and P-8 revealed that providers are not diligent 
with resolving outages, often taking days to fix them. P-8 described the 
telecommunication market as a monopoly.  
Institutional Framework 
The participants gave a similar value to federal governance, standard, and internal 
policies as evidenced in Figure 7. These elements were identified as important, but not as 
current influential factors. For instance, P-8 indicated complying with the Health 
111 
 
 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. On the other hand, most 
participants expressed a lack of familiarity with federal policies and international 
standards such as those developed by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). P-4 mentioned that 
federal guidelines are useful and more accessible than the ones provided by the state. P-5 
recognized the importance of following these guidelines but explained that the 
municipalities only follow the comptroller’s guidance which does not include federal or 
international requirements. According to P-6, not having a federal point of contact is a 
challenge to the voluntary adoption of federal guidelines. Regarding internal policies, P-3 
revealed that the municipality has just an ordinance that regulates the use of information 
systems. P-5 recommended developing and implementing municipal policies that are 
more detailed than the state governance.  
The municipalities are subject to the E-Government Act of 2004, TIGs, and 
circulars. P-3, P-6, and P-5 agreed that the state has failed to enforce compliance with the 
policies. P-5 stated, “If you have a law and you do not explain its use and not enforce it 
the law is just written on paper.” P-4 and P-6 mentioned that the comptroller performs IT 
audits, but these are done infrequently. Also, P-5 and P-7 explained that the audits have 
no clear scope, plans, nor metrics. P-1 mentioned that often people learn of the 
requirements after an incident has occurred. P-5 and P-7 provided examples of findings 
from undefined requirements and explained that could have been addressed earlier if the 
requirements were clearly defined. P-5 acknowledged that ignorance is not an exemption, 
but points to lack of training and communication as the problem.  
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P-5 and P-8 agreed that policies must be established by the state without political 
interest while leveraging standards and ensuring enforcement. P-8 recommended making 
the circulars mandatory and explained, “improving legislation will force entities to follow 
an operational standard.” P-2 described the policies as “quite complete.” However, the 
rest of the participants contended that the policies are general and up for interpretation. 
The participants affirmed that the circulars are not practical nor readily accessible, the 
format requires analysis to understand changes and applicability, and without proper 
communication, the requirements can be lost. P-7 recommended establishing a living 
policy that is accessible and updated as new requirements are enacted.  
In addition to the comptroller, the government established the CIO of Puerto Rico. 
P-6 and P-7 mentioned that the CIO is supposed to be watching over the entire 
government instead of just focusing on state agencies. P-7 affirmed that the CIO should 
be responsible for reaching out to the municipalities to understand the factors affecting 
their cybersecurity posture, develop solutions, and foster collaboration and information 
sharing. P-6 and P-7 identified information sharing as an area needing improvement, 
citing examples of state agencies that have been hacked. P-7 stated, “If we continue with 
the same concept of 78 municipalities and numerous government agencies where each 
one is doing something different, there are knowledge and experiences that are being 
lost.” The lessons learned are crucial to prevent future attacks. P-8 revealed that the state 
is legislating to empower the CIO to implement requirements across the government. 
113 
 
 
Interorganizational Collaboration and Networks 
According to P-6, “collaboration does not exist much in Puerto Rico.” Similarly, 
P-7 expressed, “the culture of collaboration does not exist.” Figure 7 shows 
interorganizational collaboration as the second lowest relevant dimension. The 
participants mentioned that collaboration with the federal and state government was 
limited to emergency response or other compulsory conditions. P-1 and P-2 experienced 
collaboration as part of system interconnection efforts. P-2 stated, “It sounds nice, like we 
can work together, but is a matter of cybersecurity defense rather than genuine 
collaboration.” Nevertheless, most of the participants recognized the lack of collaboration 
as a negative factor and expressed their wiliness to collaborate.  
P-3, P-4, and P-7 identified emergencies as collaboration opportunities. P-7 
revealed that most municipalities “do not have the budget to have a disaster recovery 
center, and after the hurricane, their fiscal situation is worse.” P-7 recommended 
establishing agreements to receive essential IT services from the municipalities proven to 
withstand a hurricane. Also, P-3 shared being part of a coalition of municipalities and 
stated, “the economic resources needed to maintain cybersecurity are too high, and in this 
coalition, we help each other.” Regarding the private sector, collaboration was limited to 
service contracts. P-4 planned to benchmark processes and technologies with public and 
private entities and affirmed that these enhancements could not be achieved in isolation. 
Organizational Structures and Processes 
Contrary to the general context dimension the organizational structures and 
processes encompassed the internal elements of the organization. These elements are 
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related to the organization’s ability to defend and protect against cyber threats. As shown 
in Figure 7, the organizational structure and processes dimension was identified as the 
most influential dimension to support resilient cybersecurity posture.  
Structure. The participants identified centralization as the most effective 
structure to manage cybersecurity but agreed that the structure should be tied to the size, 
type, resources, and complexity of the organization. From a technical view, P-5 and P-8 
justified centralization to secure and monitor the network and communication routes. P-2 
stated, “every agency should have one person in charge of cybersecurity.” However, P-1 
and P-7 affirmed that most agencies do not have a dedicated role. P-3 and P-5 explained 
that the IT office is divided into areas with cybersecurity as an additional function. P-7 
stated, “this role is assigned to someone who already has another pile of things to do. 
Therefore, you do not have a person with a clear mind to focus on this topic.” P-1 
identified the network engineer as the person usually performing this role.  
Culture. P-1 stated, “cybersecurity is taken very lightly, I do not think it is looked 
with the attention it deserves.” P-1 shared working at organizations where “cybersecurity 
is done to check the block and say that there is something in place.” P-7 affirmed that the 
concept of cybersecurity is new and is not part of the culture. P-2 mentioned, “people are 
resistant to change, especially when is related to technology.” P-5 explained that users 
still writing their passwords and keeping them under the keyboard and does not give 
credit to IT staff unless a system is down. P-4 agreed and described cybersecurity 
professionals as silent heroes working to prevent incidents. However, cybersecurity 
professionals are seen as bad guys for restricting access. P-4 stated:  
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I am one of the least popular people because one of the first things I did was 
implementing password controls such as password expiration and complexity. I 
still am a persona non grata because later I reduced access to the Internet and 
social media. 
Management support and resources. Figure 7 identified management support as 
one of the most relevant elements in the study. Participants agreed that management's 
commitment is an influential factor, because managers are responsible for assigning 
resources. P-3, P-4, P-6, and P-8 shared having a good experience with management. P-6 
described management as “pro-technology” and “very tech-savvy.” P-4 stated:  
Management support has been good at supporting cybersecurity. Whenever we 
have asked for a budget, management has seen the importance and are aware of 
the need for investment. That is why we have been able to maintain good 
programs and resources.  
However, P-3 described as difficult explaining to management why a system that 
is functional is no longer supported and must be replaced. P-1 explained, “cybersecurity 
is not seen as something that will bring a return on Investment (ROI), especially when in 
the last 10 years nothing has happened” P-3 and P-5 recommended presenting cost 
reductions, service improvement, operational enhancements, and tradeoff as ROI. P-3 
pointed at virtualization as an alternative to reduce cost by turning old computers into 
thin clients. P-2 recommended, “projects that can be subdivided into blocks that can be 
carried out over several years.” P-7 stated, “to have the best employees you cannot offer 
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the worst salaries” and shared an initiative that has saved around 20 million dollars in the 
last 10 years by hiring staff with the proper skills and compensation. 
Processes. Participants shared a vast experience of organizational processes. As 
evidenced in Figure 7, processes were identified as the most relevant element supporting 
the cybersecurity. Figure 8 provides a closer look at the list of procedures that were 
identified by the participants as key to support their cybersecurity posture.  
Access control. Processes like account management made of access control the 
third most relevant procedure and one of the most significant elements of the 
organizational structure and process dimension. P-2, P-3, P-4, P-7, and P-8 shared similar 
account management procedures where new staff agrees to the system use policy, and a 
copy of the agreement is kept in a file. P-5 uses system use notification banners to remind 
users of the conditions in the use policy. For calls related to password, P-5 requires 
identity verification consisting of security questions, supervisor validation, or a valid 
identification. P-5 and P-8 mentioned disabling the accounts of users on extended leave 
or those no longer with the agency. Most participants confirmed using role-based controls 
to configure access based on the user’s responsibilities. P-8 says the goal is to make it 
hard for a disgruntled employee and external attackers to be successful. P-5 and P-8 
mentioned that only administrators have privileged access to the systems. P-4 and P-5 
identified separation of duties as a deficiency explaining that some administrators have 
the same access because of the need to be each other’s alternate to ensure coverage.  
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Figure 8. Hierarchy chart of processes supporting cybersecurity. This figure provides a 
hierarchical view of the key process and subprocess, and their influence on the readiness of the 
organizational structures and processes dimension. The bigger the area, the more relevant to the 
posture. 
Configuration management. P-2, P-5, and P-8 perform configuration 
management over open ports/protocols/services to ensure that these are closed by default 
and allowed by exception. P-1 recommended introducing cybersecurity at the beginning 
of the system development lifecycle by including minimum requirements such as secure 
protocols, encryption, and network segmentation. P-4 emphasized the proper 
configuration of security tools to take advantage of all of their protection capabilities. P-
5, P-6, and P-7 mentioned that removable media ports are blocked by default and allowed 
through an approval process. P-3 and P-7 are proponents of the thin clients configured 
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with least functionality. P-5 mentioned using media access control address filtering to 
control access to the wireless network.  
Contingency planning. The frequent exposure to hurricanes and the recent 
experience with hurricane Maria made of contingency planning the most relevant 
process. P-1 described the experience with hurricane Maria as “frightening” and 
identified contingency planning as the number one priority. Figure 8 describes the 
relevance of contingency planning and its related elements in comparison with the other 
processes. P-8 explained, “when hurricane Maria struck, Puerto Rico was without 
electricity and other services, but the municipality was operational.” The contingency 
plans were key to the success of their continuity of operations. Figure 9 shows a mind 
map of the processes and contingency planning subcomponents identified in the study.  
Contingency training and testing. P-4, P-5, P-7, and P-8 advised testing and 
reviewing contingency plans as well as related sites and systems. P-7 acknowledged that 
the contingency efforts failed and incorporated testing to avoid future incidents. P-5 
shared a situation in which change was made, but not replicated on the alternate site, and 
the monitoring tools did not identify the discrepancy. However, during a testing exercise, 
the situation was discovered and corrected. P-5 also recommended stress testing stating, 
“if you do not do the simulation, you will not know if the system will be available.” P-5 
affirmed that testing for availability is as necessary as any other test. 
Alternate sites. P-3 affirmed not having “all the eggs in one basket” as their 
strategy included alternate site, redundant data, and voice with different providers. The 
participants shared having alternate storage and processing sites as well as performing 
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data replication. P-4 uses a hybrid cloud colocation, P-6’s alternate site includes a 
workspace, and P-8 mentioned having two data centers with mirrored equipment to serve 
as each other alternate. P-3 mentioned that virtualization help contingency efforts as 
systems could be deployed and accessed from anyplace with Internet access.  
 
Figure 9. Mind map of key processes supporting cybersecurity. This figure illustrates the key 
processes and subprocess supporting the cybersecurity posture of the local government and their 
relationship. 
Telecommunications services. P-4 discovered the difference between critical 
assets during normal operations and a time of crisis and identified telecommunications as 
the most critical assets. P-5 explained, “if the telecommunications go down, not only did 
you lose the data, you also lost your voice and you were left without communications 
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unless you have redundancy.” P-3, P-4, P-5, and P-6 mentioned having redundant 
network connections using fiber optic and wireless with different providers.  
System backups. P-7 stated, “is very important to have good backups because it is 
the only thing that can guarantee that you can return your systems to a given point in time 
in case of an attack or natural disaster.” Most participants mentioned their system backup 
strategy includes backing up critical systems more often in addition to scheduling tape 
rotation between internal and external archives.  
Incident response. P-3, P-4, and P-7 revealed being affected by ransomware. P-4 
explained that while recovering from a blackout “someone notified us that he could not 
access his data, but we understood that it was part of the recovery process, but it was 
ransomware.” The root-cause analysis pointed to a computer used for constituents to 
upload documents. As part of the lessons learned, P-4 established controls to prevent 
executables files while allowing formats required for the services. P-3 and P-4 were able 
to recover using their backups. In the case of P-7, the incident happened at a thin client, 
and instead of paying the ransom P-7’s team restored the system to the previous day.  
Physical and environmental protection. According to P-4, cloud service 
providers have everything necessary to operate out of the grid for months. Outsourcing 
those services prevented investing in the systems to support those conditions. P-5’s 
alternate site can operate for 30 days disconnected from the grid. The site consists of 
redundant water tanks, power generators, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning, and 
uninterruptible power source batteries. P-8 also shared having redundant power 
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generators and batteries. P-5 mentioned using security cameras, closed cabinets, access 
cards, in addition to access logs, and limited physical access to key personnel.  
Risk assessment. P-4 mentioned that data must be protected based on their risk 
and identified financial and PII data as the priority. P-4 explained that public information 
also needs to be protected to avoid its release outside established protocols. P-3, P-5, and 
P-7 expressed that often the personnel responsible for cybersecurity are not experts, and 
outsourcing external assessments such as penetration testing are crucial to validate the 
security controls. P-5 and P-8 recommended performing risk assessments at least twice a 
year. P-7 mentioned that the comptroller requires external assessments, but the fiscal 
situation is an obstacle to justifying the cost.  
System and information integrity. The participants acknowledged using a 
centralized approach to managed malicious code protection and vulnerability scans. P-3 
and P-4 stressed that most security solutions are reactive and used the antivirus as an 
example that protects against known threats and could leave the organization vulnerable 
to new threats. The situation increased the importance of performing vulnerability 
management to correct systems flaws. P-1 described vulnerability management as a 
recurrent task. P-5 and P-7 use a patch management system to install security updates. P-
7 uses manual patching for servers to safeguard their availability. P-5 uses network 
access control to block or update computers out of compliance.  
System and services acquisition. P-3, P-4, and P-8 recommended outsourcing 
technical support to ensure access to expert advice. P-5 and P-7 recommended including 
training vouchers as part of contracts to cover the technologies used by the municipality. 
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P-3 explained that technology changes so fast that is hard to keep staff up to date, 
whereas outsource services places the responsibility of training staff on the provider. P-4 
recommended leveraging technologies that offer security, continuity, and redundancy. P-
5 and P-8 recommended auctions and negotiation as vehicles to lower cost. Through 
negotiation, P-5 achieved cost saving of 50% less than what the state government pays 
for the same service. P-8 promoted centralized procurements to get wholesale prices. P-5 
recommended including financial penalties as part of the service level agreement to 
prevent extended outages based on the provider’s lack of responsiveness. 
Information and Data 
The information and data dimension was identified as the second most relevant to 
cybersecurity. This dimension was accredited by the participants as a fundamental input 
to support the organizational structure and processes dimension and related elements. 
Figure 7 displays the hierarchical position and the equal relevance of its elements.  
Awareness and training management. Most participants use a combination of 
classroom, online, and external training to support SETA programs. P-4 explained that 
raising awareness can be as simple as sending an email but explained that it is not an easy 
task for technicians and recommended working with human resources (HR) to achieve a 
user-friendly format. P-5 mentioned that since HR is required by the comptroller to 
provide training, P-5 leverage the training for IT purposes. As low-cost alternatives, P-3 
and P-5 recommended the using experienced employees in conjunction with a train the 
trainer model. P-5 also recommended developing user manuals as part of system 
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implementations that can be used for training. P-3 suggested a reimbursement option for 
dependencies to cover some of the costs. P-7 recommended the use of free tutorials.  
As part of SETA programs, P-4, P-5, and P-7 advocated for continuing education 
(CE). P-7 described CE as a mutual commitment where the staff commits to study, and 
the employer provides the resources. P-7 included CE as part of the position's description 
but shared that HR was not used to the requirements. P-7 stated, “these requirements are 
needed as a tool for development and as an evaluation criterion that gives us an element 
that I can put in your evaluation.” P-7 also mentioned that the government does not see 
CE as an investment for IT professionals as it does for other professions. P-7 affirmed 
that it is hard to get a budget for CE, but CE is what provides the staff with the 
knowledge to do their jobs. P-7 explained, "the Oficina de Ética Gubernamental [Office 
of Government Ethics] required completing a determined amount of time every year on 
ethical training” and endorsed adopting a similar approach. P-1 and P-5 identified 
professional associations as a low-cost training option for CE. 
Awareness training (AT). P-1 and P-4 identified users as the weakest point. P-1 
recognized AT as a tool to promote awareness, strengthen commitment, and change the 
culture. The participants affirmed providing AT to new employees, but none provide 
recurrent training. Further, P-4 acknowledged that AT had not been given to everyone. P-
4 explained that security tools are doing an excellent job preventing system-targeted 
attacks while user-targeted attacks are on the rise. P-7 mentioned that AT without 
security controls would not guarantee following the rules, but controls without AT can 
drive users to circumvent them. P-4 mentioned that users often do it unconsciously or 
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based on a false sense of security by assuming that established controls will protect them. 
P-4 stressed that users who were not trained should not be blamed for incidents.  
P-7 explained the risk of information leakage such as PII which can be used for 
identity theft. P-1 stressed the need to change “the organizational culture that believes 
that because it has not happened, it will not happen.” Similarly, P-7 mentioned that most 
people do not “realize the importance of cybersecurity until the day it hurts them.” P-3 
and P-7 agreed on the need to remind users and management about the current threats as 
well as to explain the impact these threats may have in the office and their homes. P-3 is 
confident that once “the person achieves that understanding, we get them to commit and 
support us.” According to P-4, “awareness will result in prevention.”  
Operational information and role-based training. P-1 explained that often 
cybersecurity is not taken into consideration and mentioned developers who think of 
functionality instead of cybersecurity. P-3 affirmed, “the priority is to provide services 
that are accessible, secure and efficient.” Therefore, cybersecurity training is crucial for 
technical staff. P-4 mentioned that without CE, cybersecurity professionals could be 
stuck with ineffective methods and will not be aware of new threats and mitigation. P-4 
and P-6 also recommended attending conferences and collaborating with other 
organizations to share methodologies and practices. P-5 provided the example of ethical 
hacker training where most of the attendees, were thoughtful about their vulnerabilities 
and possible remediations. P-5 stated, “you can keep public servants focused on their 
work by giving them this type of knowledge and training.” P-4 proposed sending staff to 
conferences to bring back information and follow-ups with the vendors as needed.  
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P-1 stated, “the education is the biggest challenge, and I do not mean technical, I 
am talking about upper management understanding that if we have to provide a service, it 
must be secured.” P-1, P-2, and P-5 recognized that often management lacks the 
knowledge about what needs to be implemented for cybersecurity. P-2 use news media to 
monitor cyberattacks and understand their characteristics, impact, and mitigations. P-2 
mentioned that “it sounds weird, but cyber incidents and cyberattacks are the most 
influential factors to achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture.” P-4 agreed with P-2 and 
shared an incident that helped to increase awareness on the need for cybersecurity. P-2 
recommended, “before presenting a proposal, came with a lesson to educate 
management” and justify the acquisition of new technologies to support cybersecurity. 
Technology 
The technology dimension was identified as a key enabler. The elements in this 
dimension support the element of the organizational structures and processes dimension. 
This dimension was also identified as the primary line of defense to protect and defend 
from the threats and challenges of the general context as well as insider threats.  
Access control-technical. P-4 stated, “too many people, systems, and things 
coming out every day to try to enter and get information from your network,” and 
technology provides the capability to monitor the environment. P-7 identified technology 
as the vehicle to enforce access controls and reduces the attack surface. P-4 considers 
systems to be more reliable than users who might forget what they were taught. P-8 
identified the technologies as the reason the municipality has “not suffered any 
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incidents.” As part of the access management process, P-5 use technology to enforce 
policies, including expiration, complexity, and history, among others.  
P-7 experienced incidents where “people who get very creative and get into web 
pages that they should not have, or bring a device infected with a virus.” P-4 and P-5 use 
technology to enforce limited access to applications, the Internet, and social media based 
on user roles. P-4 explained that users must use the solutions that the municipality can 
secure. P-4 and P-7 recognized mobile devices as an area of concern as users with the 
ability to configure phones and the exposure of lost or stolen devices are a risk. P-7 has a 
mobile device management solution, while P-4 is testing alternatives to address the 
situation as well as to provide the capabilities to implement future cost-effective 
strategies such as bring your own device. As mitigation, P-4 uses an application to see the 
location of the devices and performed remote erase. 
System and communications protection. The participants confirmed the use of 
boundary and cryptographic protection as the first line of defense, including unified 
threat management, firewalls, IPS, IDS, antispam, and traffic inspection. P-8 explained 
that boundary protection technologies help to enforce internal and external controls such 
as the routing of data leaving or entering the network. P-4 recommended using security 
layers starting with network-based at the boundary and host-based at the endpoint. P-3 
and P-5 recommend the use certificates to protect websites and encrypt communications. 
P-5 and P-7 mentioned that the communication of their security and network devices are 
encrypted. P-5 uses demilitarized zone to restrict systems with direct access to the 
Internet and avoid the exposure of the internal network.  
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Summary 
The central question of the study RQ1 was used to understand the perception of 
the participants on the readiness of government municipalities to protect and defend 
information resources. The result was of a positive connotation as participants perceived 
the posture of their municipality to be resilient. The participants agreed that their 
municipalities are more secure because of their ability to manage mature processes and 
leveraging supporting technologies. Nevertheless, the participants recognized having 
room to improve their cybersecurity program. 
RQ2 focused on the elements influencing the municipal cybersecurity posture 
with the intent to provide a deeper understanding of the factors enabling or hindering 
their posture. The findings validated and added a layer of elements to the dimensions 
influencing digital government. The institutional framework and interorganizational 
collaboration dimensions failed to provide the foundation to support a resilient posture. 
The organizational structures and processes dimension was discovered to be key to a 
resilient posture while the elements of the information and technology dimensions were 
crucial to support the organizational structures and processes.  
The upcoming chapter covers the interpretation of findings, including how the 
finding extended the body of knowledge and the relationship to the literature review. The 
chapter also includes a description of limitations to trustworthiness. In the same way, the 
chapter covered recommendations for future studies taking into consideration the 
strengths and limitations of the current research. Lastly, Chapter 5 is used to describe the 
potential impact for positive social change as well as the recommendations for practice.   
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to understand the cybersecurity posture of 
municipal governments from the perceptions of public servants serving in IT leadership 
roles in Puerto Rico. I also attempted to identify the primary factors influencing the 
cybersecurity posture. The perception of this population originated from their lived 
experiences with different cybersecurity concepts. A qualitative approach was used to 
examine the lived experiences of IT leaders as information-rich cases. 
The nature of this study was phenomenological. Transcendental phenomenology 
was appropriate for studying the cybersecurity posture of municipalities as a social 
problem. Most security artifacts are protected from public release by privacy laws like 
FOIA of 1966. However, individuals such as IT leaders are trustworthy and dependable 
alternate data sources that can be used to study the cybersecurity posture of municipal 
governments. 
The central finding from the perceptions of the participants regarding the posture 
of their municipalities to protect and defend information resources was resilient. The 
participants pointed to the elements of organizational structures and process dimensions 
as the reason why their municipalities are more secure. Regarding the elements 
influencing the municipal posture, the findings added a layer to the dimensions 
influencing digital government, including areas such as technological changes, politics, 
economy, management support, and processes to achieve a resilient posture.  
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Interpretation of Findings 
The findings of the study confirmed and expanded the information presented in 
the literature review. Regarding the security posture, the participants recognized that the 
posture was less resilient that the federal government, but more resilient than other 
municipalities and state agencies. Participants’ perception was based on the maturity of 
their process and their ability to maintain technologies to support their cybersecurity 
operations. The findings also confirmed the dimensions influencing digital government as 
a valid framework to capture the complexity of the local government’s cybersecurity 
posture. Further, analysis of the dimensions and the elements of the study from the lens 
of the OST confirmed that these components are interconnected, and changes in inputs, 
processes, outputs, feedback loops, and the environment can have positive or adverse 
effects on other components. Figure 10 shows the theoretical and conceptual framework 
as well as the results of the study to indicate the connection and influence of the different 
elements starting with a political interest in favor of a resilient cybersecurity posture. 
Picazo-Vela et al. (2012) identified the economy, politics, and environmental 
factors as outputs of the general context. According to participants in the current study, 
most of these elements have a null or negative effect on their posture. For instance, the 
fiscal situation has a negative effect on the municipalities’ ability to manage resources to 
support cybersecurity. Saxby (2015) identified technology investments as a significant 
challenge, particularly for small entities. However, economic growth by itself could have 
a null effect as other elements such as cyber threats or political interest will be required to 
achieve a positive response.  
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Figure 10. Concept map of political interest influence on cybersecurity. This figure combines the 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks with the results of the study to show the relationship and 
influence of the different elements affecting the local government cybersecurity posture. 
Cyber threats and new technologies were identified as primary technological 
changes affecting cybersecurity. Kenney (2015) mentioned that attackers use similar 
strategies. The participants in the current study identified ransomware, phishing emails, 
and website spoofing as common strategies. Regarding the actors, Fok (2015) divided 
attackers into several groups: hackers, amateurs, script kiddies, and people with technical 
skills looking for “fun or notoriety” (p. 33). According to participants in the current 
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study, attackers are their main threat. In addition to the threat environment, the evolution 
of technology has also brought new challenges. For instance, the participants recognized 
that the increased adoption of the Internet had resulted in an increased demand for online 
services as well as systems to support mobility and data-driven business processes. These 
systems and services increase the attack surface and exposure risk of the municipalities.  
Politicians are negatively affecting cybersecurity by not recognizing it as a 
priority. The political factor reflected in the finding is nourishing division, repetition, and 
lack of cross-government interoperability creating additional challenges. Private sector 
interest is focused on eliminating the competition and making a profit. These interests 
had also resulted in a degradation of infrastructure and a monopolized market. On the 
contrary, a political interest that prioritizes cybersecurity can serve as an input to the 
institutional framework influencing the process to develop and implement policies. 
Likewise, a positive private interest could influence the institutional framework or 
interorganizational collaboration to develop or adopt cybersecurity standards.  
The institutional framework is limited to state governance including the E-
Government Act of 2004 and circulars covering high-level requirements without 
adequate guidance. The participants reported that the policies are not well communicated, 
nor readily accessible, and are not available in a format that presents changes and current 
applicability. I confirmed these conditions during the literature review process. Federal 
guidelines can provide the body of knowledge, frameworks, and standards to manage 
cybersecurity. However, most participants expressed a lack of familiarity with federal 
policies as the participants follow best practices and the comptroller’s guidance, which 
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does not include federal or international standards. Kazemi et al. (2012) identified 
complying with standards as a crucial factor for a successful security program. 
The comptroller is responsible for performing IT audits, but these are done 
infrequent manner and do not have a clear scope, plans, or metrics. The last audit was 
done in 2016. Roesener et al. (2014) found that government agencies’ roles and 
responsibilities are often overlapping and lacking the necessary authority. These results 
are aligned with the situations of the CIO of Puerto Rico. The CIO has been deprecated 
and reenacted in recent years. Reestablished in 2017, the CIO has focused on state 
agencies instead of adopting a cross-government approach to develop solutions, foster 
collaboration, and facilitate information sharing. Elements such as political interest can 
influence the institutional framework to mandate cybersecurity standards and require 
collaboration through policies. The policies can serve as the input driving the need for a 
cross-government collaboration process. 
According to the results of the study, collaboration with the federal, state, and 
municipal governments was limited to emergency response or other compulsory 
conditions, while collaboration with the private sector was limited to contractual 
relationships. Gil-Garcia and Pardo (2005) mentioned that government entities tend to act 
independently failing to contemplate what is being done by others. Scholars agreed that 
the government alone cannot secure cyberspace and needs the support and collaboration 
of other sectors (Clinton, 2015; Hiller & Russell, 2013; Hua & Bapna, 2013; Miron & 
Muita, 2014; Roesener et al., 2014).  
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The participants acknowledged the importance of collaboration and shared their 
willingness to collaborate, but most looked at the state government as the one responsible 
for facilitating the conditions. Clinton (2015) identified policy as a vehicle to require 
cross-sector collaboration, particularly to facilitate “a common understanding around 
various risk management terms, methodologies, ideas, and language” (p. 67). One of the 
participants agreed with Clinton regarding shared planning to perform benchmarking 
with cross-sector organizations. The information shared in this dimension will serve as 
input and feedback loop to influence the organizational structures and processes.  
The capabilities to prevent and respond to cyberattacks are related to the 
organization’s structures, resources, technologies, and policies. Armbruster et al. (2013) 
discovered that the implementation of organizational processes is more challenging for 
decentralized IT departments. Flores et al. (2013) also identified centralization as an 
efficient structure. Participants in the current study confirmed these findings by 
identifying centralization as the most effective structure to manage cybersecurity 
resources and access controls. The people, their roles, and their responsibilities are also 
essential parts of the organizational structure. Reece and Stahl (2015) stressed the need 
for a managerial role such as the CISO to manage cybersecurity. The participants agreed 
but shared that cybersecurity is managed as a secondary role instead of a primary 
function. The lack of a cybersecurity manager was identified as a lesson learned from a 
cyberattack against Hacienda (Minelli-Pérez, 2017). The participants associated the 
absence of dedicated cybersecurity resources with the lack of personnel due to the fiscal 
situation.  
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Scholars agreed on the importance of understanding the organizational culture 
(Flores et al., 2013; Kazemi et al., 2012). Participants in the current study mentioned that 
the concept of cybersecurity is new and is not part of the culture, which leads to it often 
being overlooked. According to Nugent and Collar (2015), organizational culture fails to 
perceive cybersecurity professionals as heroes protecting the network. Some of the 
participants described cybersecurity professionals as silent heroes who work to prevent 
incidents. Participants also mentioned that cybersecurity professionals are often seen as 
bad guys for restricting access as part of the security controls. Kazemi et al. (2012) 
identified management support as one of the top seven factors to achieve a successful 
information security program. Management recognition of cybersecurity professionals 
can have a positive effect on job satisfaction and user awareness of cyber threats. Current 
study participants agreed that management support is crucial to the assignment of 
resources to support cybersecurity operations. Most participants shared having a good 
experience with management while others reported challenges associated with their 
understanding of security requirements and resources assignment.  
The participants shared a vast experience of organizational processes aligned with 
best practices such as the Center for Internet Security (CIS) Controls (see Figure 11) and 
high-level federal standards such as FIPS 200 (see Table 2). The main processes in order 
of relevance were related to contingency planning, System and information integrity, 
access control, risk assessment, system and services acquisition, and configuration 
management. The frequent exposure to hurricanes made contingency planning and 
related subprocesses critical to municipal IT operations. Armbruster et al. (2013) 
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explained that 71% of organizations who tested their contingency planning discovered 
problems during the testing that could have happened during a real situation. Current 
study participants identified testing as vital to the success of their contingency planning. 
The participants also mentioned having alternate processing and storage sites, as well as 
redundant telecommunication. System backup was identified as another crucial strategy 
to recover from natural or humanmade incidents. On 2017, lack of proper system backup 
caused Hacienda to lose 50 terabytes of data after an attack (Minelli-Pérez, 2017).  
 
Figure 11. CIS controls best practices and local government posture. This figure shows the 
relationship between cybersecurity best practiced and the practices followed by the municipalities 
that participated in the study. 
Participants and scholars agreed on the importance of system and information 
integrity to perform vulnerability management and malicious code protection. The 
participants shared using centralized antimalware solution and managing vulnerabilities 
through a combination of manual and automated processes. Access control processes 
were used for account management and to control access based on roles. The participants 
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also acknowledged performing risk assessment such as vulnerability assessments and 
penetration testing. Hua and Bapna (2013) mentioned the use of cost-effective 
investments to improve resiliency. The participants are using system and services 
acquisition to cover security requirements such as service support for their security tools 
and leveraging the security capabilities of the providers. Configuration management is 
used by the participants to limit and control configurations, ports, protocols, and services.  
The information dimension serves as inputs and feedback loops to provide 
awareness and role-based understanding to stimulate the culture, improve processes, and 
empower management. Most participants use a combination of classroom, online, and 
external training to support SETA programs. Adams and Makramalla (2015) shown that 
80% of exploits are related to the human element. Participants identified end users as the 
weakest link and recognized AT as a tool to promote awareness, strengthen commitment, 
and change the culture. The participants recommended cost-effective alternative 
including sending email, using experienced employees as facilitators, using a train the 
trainer model, developing user manuals as part of system implementations that can be 
used for training, using free tutorials, and leveraging professional associations. Douba et 
al. (2014) affirmed that there is a relationship between digital literacy and cyber 
resiliency. Therefore, it is crucial for technical staff to the benefit of CE in the form of 
training, conferences, and networking to share methodologies and practices.  
The priority of the participants providing services that are accessible, secure, and 
efficient. Participants identified technology as the enabler to enforce access controls and 
reduce the attack surface. Systems are considered more reliable than users who might 
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forget what they were taught. Therefore, technology is used to enforce password policies, 
including expiration, complexity, and history as well as to limit access to applications, the 
Internet, and social media based on roles. Technology serves as the primary line of 
defense to protect and defend from the threats of the general context as well as insider 
threats. All of the participants confirmed the use of boundary and cryptographic 
protection, including unified threat management, firewalls, IPS, IDS, antispam, and 
traffic inspection. Scholars agreed that these technologies are essential to prevent and 
respond to cyberattacks (Hua & Bapna, 2013; Levesque et al., 2015).  
Delimitations 
The delimitations of the study consisted of exploring the local government 
readiness to protect and defend information and systems within the San Juan – Carolina – 
Caguas MSA. The scope of the study also included analyzing the influential factors to the 
management of information resources and security controls. Patton (2002) described the 
purpose of delimitation as a method to focus on data more relevant to the problem been 
studied. For this reason, the sampling strategy excluded participants from less populated 
municipalities and concentrated on public servants working in IT leadership roles within 
the San Juan – Carolina – Caguas MSA as information-rich cases. OST served as the 
theoretical foundation to study the municipal posture as an open system influenced by its 
interactions with the external environment. Additionally, the dimensions influencing 
digital government was the conceptual framework used to identify the dimensions and 
elements of the external environment affecting the municipal cybersecurity posture. 
These delimitations helped to understand the different elements affecting the 
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phenomenon to facilitate the development of strategies to improve the cybersecurity 
resiliency of local government agencies. 
Limitations of the Study 
The limitations of the study were identified as the sampling strategy, the 
dependability of the data, and the availability of the participants. The purposeful 
sampling strategy concentrated in public servants in IT leadership roles within highly 
populated municipalities. The strategy proved to be effective as the participants served as 
information-rich cases. However, it would have been beneficial to include the perception 
of IT leaders within not highly populated municipalities. Another limitation was not 
collecting demographic information from the participants to preserve their 
confidentiality. Not having this information prevented from performing correlations of 
the results with factors such as the age or education of the participants.  
Regarding the dependability of the data, there was limited literature about 
cybersecurity at the local government level. Therefore, the literature was focused on 
national and state government levels within the United States. The primary data related to 
the local government was collected from interviews. The criterion sampling included at 
least 2 years of experience with the phenomenon which proven to increase the 
dependability of the data. The experience of the participants with the phenomenon and 
their experience with the elements affecting their cybersecurity posture was crucial to the 
study.  
The availability of the participants had the strongest impact on the study. In late 
September of 2017, a Category 5 hurricane devastated Puerto Rico. This situation 
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increased the participant's experience in disaster recovery efforts but affected their 
availability to participate in the study. The municipalities of Toa Baja and Toa Alta were 
planned to be invited to participate, but due to the situation with the hurricane were 
unreachable. Also due to availability constraints, 10 participants were interviewed, but 
two of the eight interviews were done with two participants at the time where one 
participant was the primary interviewee while the other played a supporting role. The 
sample remained within the range of five to 25 participants as recommended by Creswell 
(2013). 
Recommendations 
Several recommendations emerged from the execution of this study. The purpose 
of these recommendations is to be used to further research on cybersecurity posture as a 
phenomenon of inquiry. The recommendations are based on the strengths and limitations 
of the study, including theory, scope, limitations, and methodology. The theoretical 
foundation was OST which originated from the GST. Sher (2004) explained that GST 
focuses on the arrangements, functions, and relationships among the elements of a 
system. In addition to the relationships, Shafritz et al. (2015) considered the elements of a 
system to include “inputs, processes, outputs, and feedback loops, and the environment” 
(p. 340). These principles served as a strength to the outcome of the study as it facilitated 
the understanding of the relationships and functions of the dimensions and elements 
affecting cybersecurity. Therefore, OST is recommended for future studies.  
The conceptual framework also demonstrated to be useful to study cybersecurity. 
Since there was a significant knowledge gap about cybersecurity at the local government 
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level, the dimensions influencing digital government was used to provide an 
understanding of the different constructs that could affect the phenomenon. The 
conceptual framework consisted of six dimensions, including general context, 
institutional framework, interorganizational collaboration, organizational structures and 
processes, information and data, and technology. It is recommended for further studies to 
focus on individual dimensions or a set of related dimensions. Based on the data collected 
from the participants and the literature review, further research related to the institutional 
framework and organizational structures and processes could be beneficial to continue to 
bridge the knowledge gap about this phenomenon. 
 The scope and delimitations of the study were justifiable and necessary to gain as 
much knowledge as possible about cybersecurity at the local government. The research 
design leveraged purposeful focused on IT leadership roles in highly populated 
municipalities. The environment of these municipalities as expected increased the 
participants' exposure and experience with the phenomenon allowing them to serve as 
information-rich cases. According to the participants, their municipalities were perceived 
to be more resilient than smaller municipalities and state agencies. Participant in IT 
leadership roles should remain the unit of analysis. However, future studies should 
include participants from less populated settings to understand their perception of the 
cybersecurity posture and the elements affecting their posture. A similar approach could 
be used to study state agencies, in particular, those responsible for critical services such 
as Hacienda, OGP, Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and Puerto Rico Aqueducts and 
Sewers Authority, among others. 
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The sampling strategy included criterion sampling as a “predetermined criterion 
of importance” (Patton, 2002, Criterion sampling, para. 1). The criteria used in the study 
included participants working in IT leadership role or performing related functions with 
at least 2 years of experience working within highly populated municipalities. This 
strategy was crucial to the dependability of the data. It is recommended to use a similar 
criterion in further studies. One of the weaknesses of the study was that personnel 
meeting this criterion have limited availability to participate in studies. The data 
collection process consisted of in-person interviews with the purpose of having a more 
direct interface with the participants to help foster confidence and collaboration to 
provide as much data as possible. Future studies could use video conference technologies 
to conduct the interviews or use a combination of video conference and in-person 
interviews based on participants availability.  
Creswell (2013) narrative, phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographic, and 
case study as the main qualitative research traditions. This study used a 
phenomenological approach to understand the cybersecurity posture and influential its 
elements as a multidimensional phenomenon from the lived experience of the 
participants. Further research concentrated in a particular dimension could use a case 
study approach. Creswell described the case study methodology as exploring a real-life 
bounded system. For instance, a case study could be used to research state governance 
within institutional framework dimension as it relates to the comptroller’s IT audit of 
2016 in Puerto Rico as a bounded system while municipalities or state agencies could 
serve as the unit of analysis for the study. Similarly, processes such as contingency 
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planning within the organizational structures and processes dimension could be used to 
study the impact of hurricane Maria in 2017 over state or local government IT operations.  
Puerto Rico’s government and institutional framework resemble that of a U.S. 
state. The U.S. states also share other elements of the general context such as economic 
challenges and threats both human or natural. For instance, states like Florida, Louisiana, 
Texas, and the Carolinas have been impacted by major hurricanes. Based on these 
conditions, is also recommended conducting a replication or variation of this study in a 
U.S. state to explore the cybersecurity posture of their local governments.  
Implications 
Implications to Social Change 
The results of the study serve to raise awareness of cyberattacks as a social 
problem affecting individuals and organizations. Advances in technology have led to 
technical solutions capable of protecting against system-targeted attacked. Meanwhile, 
user-targeted attacks continue to increase. Phishing emails are the most common attack 
directed at individuals at their homes and workplaces with the intent to make the receiver 
respond with sensitive information or executing a malicious payload such as ransomware. 
The sensitive information is used to conduct identity theft or gaining access to financial 
assets while ransomware encrypts all the data in the infected system and asks for a 
ransom for the encryption key. Ransomware can spread into interconnected systems. If 
the incident happened at a government agency, individual and families might not be able 
to receive most needed services.  
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Similarly, government operations can be affected by cyberattacks as well as 
natural disaster. Both cases can result in social and economic injustice to individuals and 
communities within the affected jurisdiction. In addition to raising awareness, the 
implications of the research contribute to positive social change by providing advance 
knowledge to support future investigations and by empowering individuals and 
organizations with expert knowledge about the essential elements to support a resilient 
cybersecurity posture. Increasing awareness on cyber threats and sharing an 
understanding of the elements to manage their risks can lead individuals and 
organizations to adopt an active role to improve their posture and support public safety. 
Implications to Theory 
The main methodological implication was the usefulness of the of the research 
approach and its influence on the research design. Phenomenology was proven to be an 
effective methodology to study cybersecurity as a social problem. Cybersecurity data at 
an organizational level is protected from public release which difficult most quantitative 
strategies. Other qualitative methodologies such as case study could have made the 
participants hesitant to engage in the research as their organizations could be affected by 
the results. However, phenomenology made available data significant to the problem 
through the perception and lived experiences of the participants. This approach increased 
the need to access information-rich cases which drove the purposeful criterion sampling 
strategy. Phenomenology also led to the selection of face to face interviews with open-
ended questions to establish a connection with the participants to allow them to share as 
most information as possible. 
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The theoretical implications included the application of OST and the dimensions 
influencing digital government conceptual framework as the theoretical lenses to interpret 
the findings. Dimensions influencing digital government divided the environment into six 
dimensions. Within each dimension, different elements were identified. The conceptual 
framework provided a deep understanding of the function of these elements and a brief 
understanding of their relationship. OST was able to augment this understanding by 
identifying the elements’ relationships and influence over one another as inputs, 
processes, outputs, and feedback loops within the environment. 
The contribution the body of knowledge is the most significant empirical 
implications. Part of the purpose of this study was understanding the cybersecurity 
posture of the local governments and identifying the factors influencing their posture with 
the intent to bridge the knowledge gap about this phenomenon. Literature about the 
phenomenon was limited to national and international settings. The results of this study 
contributed to the body of knowledge by providing research-based data addressing gap 
about cybersecurity at the local governments. The dimension and elements affecting 
cybersecurity and their relationship were identified as part of the study. This empirical 
data can serve as the foundation for future investigations. 
Implications to Practice 
The implications to practice are related to the findings discovered within the 
elements of the dimensions influencing digital government. The implications can help to 
provide awareness of the general context, tools to strengthen the institutional framework, 
alternative for interorganizational collaboration, information resources, and technology 
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management. The results of the study can also benefit the municipalities to leverage the 
elements of the institutional framework, information and data, and technology 
dimensions to improve organizational structures and processes.  
From the general context, technological changes particular to the threat 
environment were identified as the primary challenge. The U.S. Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (n.d.) manages the National Cyber Awareness System. This system 
consists of five products including Alerts, Analysis Reports, Bulletins, Current Activity, 
and Tips to inform the government, private sector, and the general population about cyber 
threats and mitigations. IT staff, as well as nontechnical staff, can register to receive 
notifications for the areas interest to maintain awareness on the threat environment. 
Regarding positive or negative influence from elements such as the economy, politics, 
and private interest can be managed with processes within the organizational structures 
and processes dimension. 
According to the results of the study, there is a significant gap in the institutional 
framework. The Government of Puerto Rico can use existing federal governance as the 
foundation to improve their current policies. For instance, the state government could use 
FISMA of 2014 as a guiding source to update the E-Government Act of 2004. Similarly, 
the Government of Puerto Rico could use OMB Circular A-130, Managing Federal 
Information as a Strategic Resource to update or consolidate current circulars. The state 
and municipal governments could use FIPS 200 to guide the development of uniform 
minimum security requirements.  
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According to the results of the study, the government security requirements and 
the scope of the comptroller’s IT audit were not clear. The state government including the 
comptroller and the CIO of Puerto Rico could adopt NIST SPs as guidelines to support 
cybersecurity activities across the government. SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled 
Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations could help to develop 
minimum security requirements into manageable security controls. In the same way, the 
comptroller could use SP 800-171A, Assessing Security Requirements for Controlled 
Unclassified Information to develop clear audit scope, plans, and metrics.  
Regarding standards and best practices, the participants identified that 
municipalities follow best practices and limit the implementation of standards to those 
required by the comptroller. Most standards could be expensive to implement, including 
the cost to access their related information. However, NIST guidelines are free to the 
public and are aligned with Committee for National Security Systems and international 
standards such as “ISO/IEC 27001, Information technology–Security techniques–
Information security management systems–Requirements and ISO/IEC 15408, 
Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT security” 
(Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2013, p. H-1). The Federal Trade 
Commission offers free access to best practices endorsed by the government that is 
available in English and Spanish (Federal Trade Commission, 2018). In the same way, 
CIS offers community developed best practices with some of the documentation available 
in English and Spanish (CIS, 2018). The resources in the institutional framework can be 
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used by IT leaders and policymakers to raise awareness, develop, and implement detailed 
policies in alignment with national and international cybersecurity practices.  
The absence of collaboration was identified as an area of concern. Outside 
compulsory conditions, no collaboration with the federal government was identified. 
NICE is a federal program consisting of “a partnership between government, academia, 
and the private sector focused on cybersecurity education, training, and workforce 
development” (NIST, 2018, p. 1). NICE serves as a collaboration platform for local, 
state, and federal governments. State and municipal government entities could join 
NICE’ workgroups to benefit from the collaboration activities and start networking 
efforts with other government entities. The state government could use the institutional 
framework to buoy up interorganizational collaboration or appoint the CIO as the 
responsible entity to establish a collaboration platform that includes the local 
governments. Also, the municipal government could establish collaboration initiates with 
neighboring municipalities, local academic institution, and the private sector.  
The organizational structures and processes reflect the organizational posture by 
using its structure, roles, and procedures to protect information and systems from the 
challenges and threats of the general context, comply with the institutional framework, 
and advance operation by using interorganizational collaboration, information, and 
technology as feedback loops. For instance, information about the threat environment 
such as the one provided by the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team can help 
prepare to defend and protect the organizational against current threats as well as to gain 
management support by justifying the need for technologies or personal to support 
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cybersecurity operations. Economic situations such as the current fiscal crisis can be 
detrimental to cybersecurity operation. However, long-term capital planning, centralized 
procurement, contract negotiation, and Agile project approach can help to reduce cost and 
improve the management of available resources. 
The results of the study shown that cybersecurity is treated as a secondary role. 
Cybersecurity is a complex domain composed of multiple operational processes related to 
access control, configuration management, contingency planning, risk assessment, system 
and services acquisition, and system and information integrity, among others. Failing to 
have dedicated resources to make sure that the processed are defined, implemented, and 
managed will have an adverse effect on the cybersecurity posture. In the absence of a 
dedicated cybersecurity professional, the information and technology dimensions are 
crucial to mitigate the situation. AT is crucial to raise awareness, change the culture, and 
give the users the tools to help protect the organization from cyber threats. Municipalities 
should include AT for every new user as well as yearly as a reminder to existing users. 
The participants recommended that the central government develop and make available 
the training to reduce duplicative effort and related cost.  
Similar to AT, role-based training is fundamental to maintained technical staff up 
to date, especially when the technical staff working with cybersecurity as a secondary 
function. As recommended by the participants, CE should be part of the position 
description and encourage by the employer. The municipalities could use online courses, 
webinars, conference, formal courses, professional associations, and resources from the 
interorganizational collaboration dimension to make sure the staff is well equipped with 
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the information necessary to safeguard the organization through the management of 
cybersecurity-related processes and technologies.  
Technology is the central defense against threats and the mechanism to implement 
access controls. Therefore, it is crucial for these tools to be properly configured. Security 
technical implementation guides are the configuration standards developed by Defense 
Information Systems Agency (n.d.) to harden against attacks. CIS offers similar guides 
refer to as Benchmarks that can also be used to configure technologies securely (CIS, 
2018). These guides are free to the public. Municipalities can leverage these guides to 
configure their technologies to be resilient against cyberattacks.  
Conclusions 
Cyberspace is a new domain that policies have not been able to address with 
success. Policies like FISMA of 2014 assign responsibilities to federal agencies, while 
leaving state and local governments without a legal obligation and resources to protect 
their information and systems while putting their operations and the wellbeing of their 
constituents at risk. At the same times, advances in technology and constituents demand 
continue to drive the implementation of online services. Kazemi et al. (2012) explained 
that the increasing dependency on these technologies is reflected on the upsurge of cyber 
threats.  
In addition to increasing the exposure to cyber threats, the interconnectivity 
within cyberspace increased the risk to compromise interconnected systems. Therefore, 
the compromised of a municipal or state system could jeopardize the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of other interconnected municipal, state, or federal systems. 
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Municipal governments use the same types of sensitive information as other government 
entities. Municipalities also serve as first responders, critical infrastructure providers, and 
are responsible for local economic development (Miron & Muita, 2014; Sylves, 2015). 
Therefore, risks against their IT infrastructure can cause social and economic injustice to 
the individuals and communities in their jurisdiction. It is critical that public servants 
understand the factors influencing the cybersecurity posture of their agencies.  
The results of this study contributed to the body of knowledge to bridge the gap 
between in literature, theory, and practice. The results of the study provided information 
on the challenges and strategies related to the cybersecurity posture of the local 
government based on the perception of committed IT leaders who work to protect their 
organizations from cyber incidents while delivering accessible, secure, and efficient 
services to support the mission of their municipalities and their constituents. The outcome 
of the study validated the applicability of the OST and the dimensions influencing digital 
government as theoretical lenses to study the phenomenon while expanding the 
conceptual frameworks to include additional elements affecting cybersecurity and their 
relationships. The results of the study also provided research-based solutions to empower 
practitioners with the knowledge to improve the different elements affecting 
cybersecurity with the goal to achieve a resilient cybersecurity posture.  
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Appendix A: Cybersecurity Dimensions covered by TIGs 
Policy Summary Dimension and E-
Government Goals 
Development and 
Maintenance of 
Government Websites 
(Policy TIG-002)  
Make agencies responsible for developing and maintaining 
websites to provide a virtual alternative to access information 
and services. The policy requires the development of policies 
and procedures for the operation and maintenance of websites 
in compliance with the TIG-003. The policy includes audits for 
the evaluation of the content, design, and usability, but not for 
security control.  
General Context: 
• Increase citizen 
participation 
• Improve services  
• Ensure socially 
inclusiveness 
Technology Services 
(Policy TIG-004) 
Provides guidelines for the technology services offered by the 
OGP, as well as to understand the conditions and 
responsibilities for the services. Services such as training, 
licensing, firewall, email, antivirus, and consulting are not 
directly available to municipalities. 
Organizational Structure 
and Processes: 
• Reduce costs and 
burdens 
• Improve services  
Development, 
Integration, and 
Publication of 
Governmental 
Electronic 
Transactions (Policy 
TIG-006) 
Outlines responsibilities and requirements regarding the 
development, implementation, and publication of online 
services. The policy requires encryption for the communication 
and exchange confidential information. The policy indicated the 
use of Secure Sockets Layer protocol but does not specify 
which version.  
Note: Most SSL have been deprecated by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force RFC 6176 and 7568. 
General Context: 
• Increase citizen 
participation 
• Improve services  
• Reduce costs and 
burdens 
• Ensure socially 
inclusiveness 
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Policy Summary Dimension and E-
Government Goals 
Disposition of 
Equipment and 
Licenses (Policy TIG-
007) 
Describes the mechanisms to ensure that agencies properly 
dispose of IT hardware and software. The agencies are 
responsible for deciding the best method (overwriting or 
degaussing) to remove information, but there is not mentioned 
of related standards or best practices. The policy permits the 
transfer of obsolete equipment to other agencies. The policy 
does mention that equipment cannot be transferred due to 
security reasons but does not specify the reasons. Further, there 
is no mentioned of audits to validate compliance with the 
policy.  
Note: Obsolete technology can introduce vulnerabilities, 
especially as they may no longer be supported by the vendors. 
Organizational Structure 
and Processes: 
• Reduce costs and 
burdens 
• Protecting privacy, 
security, and 
availability 
Use of Information 
Systems, the Internet, 
and E-Mail (Policy 
TIG-008) 
Defines the acceptable use of information handled through 
information systems, Internet technologies, and email to protect 
end users and the government from cyber incidents. The policy 
provides guidance without referencing standards.  
Information and Data: 
• Protecting privacy, 
security, and 
availability 
Integration of 
Financial Systems 
(Policy TIG-009) 
Requires government entities to implement payroll, finance, 
and human resources systems providing interoperability and 
integration with the Hacienda. 
Interorganizational 
Collaboration and 
Networks: 
• Promote interagency 
collaboration  
• Reduce costs and 
burdens 
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Policy Summary Dimension and E-
Government Goals 
Acquisition of 
Equipment for 
Automated 
Information Systems 
(Policy TIG-010) 
Specifies the minimum standards all procurement of IT 
equipment must follow to ensure that it supports the e-
government. The policy provides broad requirements, including 
• Capability to integrate with the government systems  
• Comply with the standards and requirements for acquisition  
• Meet the minimum capacity requirements and quality 
assurance  
• Comply with the TIG-003 security requirements 
Organizational Structure 
and Processes: 
• Promote interagency 
collaboration  
• Reduce costs and 
burdens 
• Support procurement 
• Protecting privacy, 
security, and 
availability 
Technology 
Infrastructure Best 
Practices (Policy 
TIG-011) 
Establishes best practices to acquire and implement IT 
infrastructure components, including platforms, software, 
networks, and data. There is no reference to industry standards 
other than the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 
Mandate agencies to establish methodologies to ensure the 
integrity, reliability, deduplication, and confidentiality of the 
data, but those not provide guidance. 
Technology: 
• Reduce costs and 
burdens 
• Support procurement 
• Protecting privacy, 
security, and 
availability 
Government 
Technology 
Procurement 
Reference Framework 
(Policy TIG-013) 
 
This policy establishes practices that every agency within the 
executive branch must follow to purchase technology goods and 
services. 
 
Organizational Structure 
and Processes: 
• Reduce costs and 
burdens 
• Support procurement 
• Protecting privacy, 
security, and 
availability 
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Policy Summary Dimension and E-
Government Goals 
Continuity of 
Government Program 
(Policy TIG-015) 
 
Provides guidelines to establish programs to ensure operational 
continuity of critical government functions. The policy requires 
the use of tools and plans such as risk analysis, business impact 
analysis, disaster recovery plan, business continuity plan, 
incident management, emergency management, training, and 
test programs, among others. The policy follows the Disaster 
Recovery Institute International guidelines and practices. There 
is no mention of funding to accomplish these tasks. Other 
standards such as NIST SP 800-34 Rev. 1, Contingency 
Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems could be more 
cost-effective. 
Technology: 
• Improve services  
• Protecting privacy, 
security, and 
availability 
Application 
Programming 
Interface - API 
(Policy TIG-016) 
Requires database projects to have a plan to interconnect with 
other agencies, including a process for defining policies, 
analyzing jurisdictions, validating security compliance, 
reviewing data classification, determining third party’s 
interactions, and creating public policy on the particular 
programs and integration points.  
Requires compliance with privacy laws at the state and federal 
level but does not identify the laws. It also requires compliance 
with other TIGs such as TIG-003, TIG-017, and TIG-019. 
Interorganizational 
Collaboration and 
Networks: 
• Promote interagency 
collaboration  
• Improve services  
• Reduce costs and 
burdens 
• Protecting privacy, 
security, and 
availability 
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Policy Summary Dimension and E-
Government Goals 
Data Classification 
and Security 
Categorization 
(Policy TIG-019).  
The policy is divided into two areas. The first area provides 
guidance for determining the sensitivity of data to establish its 
proper classification and categorization. The second area relates 
to the protective measures to safeguard sensitive data. This 
policy takes advantage of federal standards and guidance.  
• Defines accountable roles (data owner, system owner, etc.) 
aligned with NIST guidelines. 
• Requires the use of FIPS 199, Standards for Security 
Categorization of Federal Information and Information 
Systems as the standard to determine security categorization.  
• Provide detailed guidance to secure information on physical 
(limited and authorized access), transit (Requires FIPS 140-
2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules 
compatible encryption), and storage contexts.  
• Requires the disposition of equipment and media to be 
sanitized in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-
88, Guidelines for Media Sanitization. 
Information and Data: 
• Protecting privacy, 
security, and 
availability 
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
Date:  
Place:  
Interviewer:  
Interviewee: Pseudonyms. The identity of the participant will be confidential. 
Two or more years of experience related to cybersecurity at the local government level:  
Questions Notes 
1. How do you perceive the cybersecurity 
posture of local government 
municipalities in Puerto Rico in 
comparison with state and federal 
agencies? 
 
2. What is your organization doing to 
safeguard their information resources 
from cyber threats and do you consider 
it to be sufficient? 
 
3. What factors do you consider are most 
influential to achieve a resilient 
cybersecurity posture in municipalities 
within Puerto Rico? 
 
4. Described how these factors 
interconnect and their sequence or 
priority order. 
 
5. What do you think are the main 
challenges affecting these factors? 
 
6. What strategies do you recommend 
mitigating these challenges and 
improve the cybersecurity posture? 
 
7. What is your perception of federal and 
state information security policy 
governing cybersecurity?  
 
8. What do you foresee for the role of 
interorganizational collaboration in 
cybersecurity? 
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Questions Notes 
9. What do you consider to be key 
cybersecurity related processes that 
need to be in place to achieve a 
resilient cybersecurity posture? 
 
10. What organizational structure do you 
find to be more efficient for 
cybersecurity management and why?  
 
11. How engaged are the public servants in 
your organization with cybersecurity 
and what are your recommendations to 
improve or sustain their level of 
engagement? 
 
12. In your experience, what are the main 
challenges and benefits of technology 
solutions to support cybersecurity 
operations? 
 
13. Anything you would like to add to this 
interview? 
 
 
